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Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs? 
JASON IULIANO* 
Despite two hundred years of jurisprudence on the topic of corporate 
personhood, the Supreme Court has failed to endorse a philosophically defensible 
theory of the corporation. In this Article, I attempt to fill that void. Drawing upon 
the extensive philosophical literature on personhood and group agency, I argue 
that corporations qualify as persons in their own right. This leads me to answer the 
titular question with an emphatic yes. Contrary to how it first seems, that 
conclusion does not warrant granting expansive constitutional rights to 
corporations. It actually suggests the opposite. Using the Affordable Care Act’s 
contraception mandate as a case study, I develop this theory of corporate 
personhood and explore some of its constitutional implications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Do corporations have religious beliefs? In a word, yes. They also have fears, 
hopes, desires, and worries. Some even love; others get angry. Truth be told, 
corporations are a pretty emotional bunch. Open any newspaper, and you will see 
corporate intentionality on full display, such as in the following excerpts: 
 “Facebook wants to go head-to-head with Google in the fight for small-
business advertising.”1 
                                                                                                                 
 
 † Copyright © 2015 Jason Iuliano. 
 * Ph.D. candidate in politics, Princeton University; J.D., Harvard Law School. Thanks 
to Tom Kelly, Madison Kilbride, Philip Pettit, Rebecca Rix, Keith Whittington, and the 
participants of the American Politics workshop at Princeton University for their valuable 
discussions relating to this project. 
 1. Nick Bilton, Facebook Will Allow Users To Share Location, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Mar. 
9, 2010, 1:44 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/facebook-will-allow-users-to
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 “Verizon worries that, without instruction from lawmakers, the [FCC] will 
continue to be pressured to expand its authority in this area . . . .”2 
 “Microsoft fears that Google could become a kind of operating system of 
the Internet . . . .”3 
 “The Big Ten is angry at Comcast. And Comcast is angry at the Big Ten. 
The conference needs the cable operator, the nation’s largest, to carry its 
fledgling network.”4 
In this Article, I seek to defend the claim that corporations actually possess these 
emotions. They genuinely do have worries, fears, and other mental states. These 
ascriptions are not mere metaphors. They are identifications of legitimate intentional 
states.5 If I am correct in my assertion, this observation has important implications for 
corporate personhood. In particular, it shows that corporations are agents in their own 
right; they possess mental states that are independent of the mental states of their 
members. In other words, corporations have minds of their own. 
Moreover, corporations have very sophisticated minds of their own. They 
exhibit rationality and, accordingly, are able to acquire information from the 
outside world and update their beliefs and actions in light of such information. In 
line with today’s prevailing philosophical theories of group agency, I argue that the 
intentionality and rationality exhibited by corporations is sufficient for them to 
qualify as persons. 
Many judges have strongly rejected this claim, defending their denial of 
corporate personhood by appealing to the belief that corporations lack 
intentionality.6 Most notably, perhaps, in his Citizens United dissent, Justice 
Stevens wrote that “corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no 
thoughts, no desires.”7 In this Article, I argue that Justice Stevens’s sentiment is 
mistaken. I defend the view that corporations are intentional agents and, going 
even further, that they are persons. They are not flesh-and-blood humans like you 
and me. Nonetheless, they are persons in a very real sense. Importantly, my 
argument does not require that corporations be granted the same range of 
constitutional rights that natural persons enjoy. Instead, its primary purpose is to 
illustrate that corporations are not mere reflections of their shareholders or 
employees. As philosophical theories show, they are persons in their own right. 
                                                                                                                 
-share-location (emphasis added). 
 2. Eliza Krigman, Verizon: FCC Suit Not Tied to a Plan, POLITICO, Feb. 3, 2011, at 6 
(emphasis added). 
 3. Steve Lohr & Saul Hansell, Microsoft and Google Set To Wage Arms Race, N.Y. 
TIMES, May, 2, 2006, at C1 (emphasis added). 
 4. Richard Sandomir, Tempers Flare over Network for Big Ten, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 
2007, at D5 (emphasis added). 
 5. For a discussion of intentionality, see infra Part III. 
 6. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e simply cannot understand how a 
for-profit, secular corporation—apart from its owners—can exercise religion.”), rev’d sub 
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); see also infra Part I.C. 
 7. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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To illustrate the practical import of my theory, I center the discussion on Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.—a corporate personhood case recently decided by the 
Supreme Court.8 Prior to Hobby Lobby, the Justices had never decided whether 
for-profit corporations were entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause9 or 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).10 This case provided the first 
opportunity to rule on those issues. The problem at hand arose in light of the 
contraception mandate, a provision within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act.11 Specifically, the contraception mandate forces corporations to carry health 
insurance plans that provide their employees with contraceptive coverage.12 
Many business owners have objected on religious grounds, asserting that this 
mandate infringes upon their free exercise rights and the free exercise rights of their 
corporations.13 To many observers, this latter claim seems particularly absurd. 
These observers deny the intentionality of corporations and, accordingly, the ability 
of corporations to hold religious beliefs. Perhaps the New York Times summed up 
this argument best: “The lawsuits share a basic flaw: Profit-making corporations 
are not human beings capable of engaging in religious exercise to begin with.”14 
In my defense of corporate personhood, I attempt to refute this conception by 
showing that corporations, indeed, can hold religious beliefs. From here, I argue 
that they do qualify for protection under the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA. I 
reach this conclusion by a different path than the Supreme Court. Whereas the 
majority in Hobby Lobby reduced a corporation’s beliefs to the beliefs of its 
owners,15 I maintain that corporations possess beliefs that are truly their own. They 
are distinct entities with distinct intentional states. 
In some ways, my theory is more extreme than the one adopted by the Hobby 
Lobby majority. After all, I posit that corporations are entitled to constitutional 
protections in their own right. In other respects, however, my theory is almost as 
restrictive as the view endorsed by the dissent—namely, that for-profit corporations 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. 134 S. Ct. 2751. 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 10. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012)); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 
S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Until this litigation, no decision of this Court 
recognized a for-profit corporation’s qualification for a religious exemption from a generally 
applicable law, whether under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA.”); Lyle Denniston, Court 
To Rule on Birth-Control Mandate, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 26, 2013, 3:47 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/court-to-rule-on-birth-control-mandate/ (“[I]t is not 
clear that a business that is formed as a corporation, and engages in a strictly commercial 
kind of activity, can have religious beliefs and can actually base its commercial actions upon 
such faith principles . . . . The Court has never ruled on that issue, but that is one of the core 
issues it has now agreed to consider.”). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012). 
 12. For a detailed discussion of this provision, see infra Part I.A. 
 13. For a comprehensive listing of cases filed so far, see  HHS Mandate Information Central, 
BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral. 
 14. Editorial, Contraception and Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2013, at A18. 
 15. See 134 S. Ct at 2774–75. 
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are ineligible for religious protections.16 I reach this conclusion by observing that 
for-profit corporations are unlikely to hold sincere religious beliefs. 
In order to receive protection under the Free Exercise Clause or the RFRA, 
corporations—like natural persons—must prove that their religious beliefs are 
sincere.17 Insincere beliefs are unworthy of constitutional protection.18 It seems 
quite clear that any religious beliefs that are driven by a desire to maximize profits, 
as certain corporations are legally required to do, cannot possibly be sincere. This 
understanding of the corporation provides a clear way to delimit the types of 
corporations that can succeed in their religious claims. 
At one extreme exist for-profit corporations that are organized solely for the 
purpose of maximizing shareholder value. These corporations cannot possibly 
satisfy the test by advancing sincere religious claims. After all, any actions that 
conflict with maximizing wealth (including adhering to religious beliefs) would be 
incompatible with their mission statements, charters, and bylaws. At the other 
extreme sit religious nonprofit corporations such as churches. The Supreme Court 
has very clearly held that these organizations are entitled to free exercise 
protections.19 Under my analysis, these nonprofit corporations would still be able to 
advance sincere religious claims. 
Due to the competing goals of the corporate claimant, Hobby Lobby lies 
somewhere in the middle. In particular, the corporation is tasked with both maximizing 
profit and upholding religious values. In these instances, courts must examine the 
case-specific facts to determine which goal is dominant. The courts have done a 
respectable job ferreting out insincere religious claims of individuals.20 Therefore, I 
believe they have the skill to tell the difference between disingenuous corporate 
claimants and those that are seeking to protect sincere religious beliefs. Companies 
that assert free exercise claims for the purpose of increasing profits will simply not 
succeed. Given the requirements imposed by the sincerity test, there is little reason to 
believe that corporate free exercise protections will be abused. Despite receiving no 
discussion in the litigation surrounding the contraception cases, the sincerity test really 
is the true hurdle for corporate free exercise and RFRA claims. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“There is . . . no support for the notion that 
free exercise rights pertain to for-profit corporations.”). 
 17. The Supreme Court has long recognized that only sincerely held religious beliefs 
fall within the Free Exercise Clause. For a thorough discussion of the sincerity test, see infra 
Part V; see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714–16 (1981) (holding that denying 
unemployment compensation benefits to a petitioner who had terminated his employment 
because of an “honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion” would 
violate the petitioner’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216–219 (1972) (finding that an Amish claimant’s religious conviction 
was sincerely held). 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444–45 (D.D.C. 1968); Hansell 
v. Purnell, 1 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1924); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 14-12, at 1242–51 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that a free exercise claimant must show that 
the law imposes a burden on a sincerely held religious belief). 
 19. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 20. See infra Part V. 
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The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I detail the dispute over 
the contraception mandate’s constitutionality. After providing a historical review 
of the Supreme Court’s corporate personhood jurisprudence, I examine how 
contraception mandate cases have employed that doctrine. In Part II, I discuss the 
major philosophical theories of personhood. Following a line of argument that 
extends back to Thomas Hobbes, I show how corporations could be characterized 
as persons. In Parts III and IV, I draw upon philosophical arguments in the areas 
of joint intentionality and group agency. Insights in these domains further clarify 
why corporations should be regarded as persons in their own right. Finally, in 
Part V, I examine existing case law on the free exercise sincerity test. I conclude 
by arguing that this test offers an important limitation that can be used to prevent 
disingenuous corporate claimants from obtaining protection under the Free 
Exercise Clause or the RFRA. 
I. THE CONTRACEPTION MANDATE 
A. The Issue 
On March 23, 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA).21 The provision in the ACA at issue here requires employer-sponsored 
group health plans to cover “preventive care and screenings” for women.22 
Congress failed to define “preventive care and screenings,” instead choosing to 
delegate that task to the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).23 
After consulting with the Institute of Medicine at the National Academy of 
Science, HRSA promulgated guidelines that defined “preventive care and 
screenings” as including, among other things, “contraceptive methods and 
counseling.”24 HRSA further clarified that, to fulfill the requirements under this 
section, insurance plans must cover “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and 
counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.”25 FDA-approved birth 
control includes barrier methods, hormonal methods, emergency contraceptives, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012). 
 23. The relevant passage reads as follows: 
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual 
health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall 
not impose any cost sharing requirements for . . . (4) with respect to women, 
such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as 
provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources 
and Services Administration [an agency within the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS)] for purposes of this paragraph. 
Id. 
 24. Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands Prevention 
Coverage for Women’s Health and Well-Being, HRSA.GOV, http://www.hrsa.gov
/womensguidelines. 
 25. Id. 
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intrauterine devices, and sterilization.26 Several of these methods—the emergency 
contraceptives and intrauterine devices—work by preventing implantation of a 
fertilized egg,27 while the rest function by preventing fertilization. In February 
2012, HHS adopted the HRSA guidelines.28 These guidelines took effect on August 
1 of that same year.29 
Employers who offer health plans that fail to comply with the contraception mandate 
face a federal tax of $100 per day per employee.30 Over the course of a single year, this 
adds up to $36,500 per employee. Alternatively, an employer who forgoes offering 
health plans altogether is assessed a tax of $2000 per year for each employee.31 
Like most provisions within the ACA, these taxes apply to employers with fifty 
or more full-time employees.32 There are, however, a few exceptions. One such 
exception allows health plans that existed prior to March 24, 2010, to be 
grandfathered into the current system. So long as these plans do not undergo certain 
changes, they will remain exempt from many of the minimum coverage 
requirements (including the contraception mandate).33 
HHS also granted religious employers an exemption from the mandate. Initially, 
HHS defined a “religious employer” as “an organization that meets all of the 
following criteria”: 
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization. 
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious 
tenets of the organization. 
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious 
tenets of the organization. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Birth Control: Medicines To Help You, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers
/byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.htm (last updated Aug. 27, 2013). 
 27. There is a debate in the medical community over whether these methods of 
contraception work by preventing implantation or fertilization. For a summary of this debate, 
see Pam Belluck & Erik Eckholm, Groups Equate Abortion with Some Contraceptives, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at A13. For purposes of the Hobby Lobby dispute, however, it is not 
necessary to resolve the exact mechanism by which each of the contraceptive methods 
works. Both parties to the dispute agreed that at least some of the contraceptive methods 
have the potential to disrupt implantation. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 
F.3d 1114, 1123 n.3 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 28. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services, 77 Fed Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2013)). 
 29. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8726. 
 30. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(a), (b)(1) (2012). 
 31. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c) (2012). 
 32. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A). 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2012). For a list of changes that trigger loss of grandfathered 
status, see CIGNA, INFORMED ON REFORM: GRANDFATHERED STATUS FACT SHEET 2 (2014), 
available at http://www.cigna.com/assets/docs/about-cigna/informed-on-reform/grandfathered
-plan-fact-sheet.pdf. 
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(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section 
6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.34 
Opponents of the contraception mandate immediately derided these criteria as 
too restrictive.35 They feared that, without a broader exemption, Americans’ First 
Amendment free exercise rights would be trampled.36 Religious hospitals, 
universities, charities, faith-based nonprofits, and for-profit corporations run 
according to religious principles would all be forced to violate their religious faith 
to abide by the contraception mandate.37 
To allow time to work out a solution, HHS granted religious nonprofit 
organizations a one-year safe harbor from enforcement.38 During that period, HHS 
adopted a revised definition of “religious employer,” dropping the first three 
criteria completely and modifying the last criterion to include any “organization 
that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.”39 HHS 
pointedly noted that this new formulation does not materially change the meaning 
of “religious employer” but merely serves to clarify the agency’s original intent.40 
During the same period, HHS also adopted rules that allow some religiously 
affiliated organizations to obtain an “accommodation”—basically a workaround 
that requires organizations’ insurers to provide contraceptive coverage free of 
charge if the organization objects to paying for coverage itself.41 Notably, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B). 
 35. See, e.g., U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, SWEEPING HHS MANDATE 
STANDS, VIOLATING CONSCIENCE RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2012), available at 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/conscience-protection/upload/HHS
_Mandate_English-Bulletin-Insert_Feb2012.pdf (“The exemption provided for ‘religious 
employers’ was so narrow that it failed to cover the vast majority of faith-based 
organizations—including Catholic hospitals, universities, and charities—that help millions 
every year. Ironically, not even Jesus and his disciples would have qualified for the 
exemption, because it excludes those who mainly serve people of another faith.”). 
 36. See Letter from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Assoc. Gen. Sec’y & Gen. Counsel, and 
Michael F. Moses, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, to Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 3 (Mar. 20, 2013), 
available at http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/upload/2013-NPRM
-Comments-3-20-final.pdf. 
 37. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 35. 
 38. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (“With respect to certain non-exempted, non-profit organizations 
with religious objections to covering contraceptive services whose group health plans are not 
grandfathered health plans, guidance is being issued contemporaneous with these final 
regulations that provides a one-year safe harbor from enforcement by the Departments.”). 
 39. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013). 
 40. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,874 (July 2, 2013) (“[T]he simplified and clarified definition of 
religious employer does not expand the universe of religious employers that qualify for the 
exemption beyond that which was intended in the 2012 final regulations . . . .”). 
 41. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 
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accommodation does not extend to for-profit corporations run according to 
religious principles that directly conflict with the contraception mandate.42 
The lack of an exemption for for-profit entities has caused a backlash among 
religious business owners and led to a proliferation of lawsuits involving the 
mandate.43 Since HHS promulgated its contraception insurance regulations, more than 
one hundred lawsuits have been filed challenging the mandate on statutory and 
constitutional grounds.44 Opponents of the mandate have been quite successful in 
court. Of the eighty-one cases decided prior to the Supreme Court ruling, seventy-one 
resulted in injunctive relief.45 The courts denied injunctive relief in only seven cases.46 
Six U.S. courts of appeals examined the issue.47 Four ruled in favor of striking down 
the contraception mandate, while two ruled against doing so. Undoubtedly due in part 
to this circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two of these cases: Hobby 
Lobby48 and Conestoga.49 In its decision last Term, the Supreme Court sided with a 
majority of the appellate courts by providing a constitutional exemption to the mandate 
for closely held corporations with religious objections. 
In these cases, the main issues were (1) whether shareholders have standing to 
challenge the mandate and (2) whether corporations are “persons” capable of 
exercising religious rights for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause and the 
                                                                                                                 
78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8458–68 (Feb. 6, 2013). 
 42. Only organizations that satisfy the following conditions are eligible for the 
accommodation: 
(1) The organization opposes providing coverage for some or all of any 
contraceptive services required to be covered under § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) on 
account of religious objections. 
(2) The organization is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity. 
(3) The organization holds itself out as a religious organization. 
(4) The organization self-certifies, in a form and manner specified by the 
Secretary, that it satisfies criteria in paragraphs (b)(1) through (3) of this 
section . . . . 
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b) 
 43. Religious leaders have argued that the accommodation provides inadequate relief. See 
Letter from Cardinal Timothy Dolan, Archbishop of N.Y., to U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops (Sept. 17, 2013), available at http://archphila.org/HHS/pdf/USCCB13-237.pdf (“[T]he 
final version of the mandate still suffers from the same three basic problems we have 
highlighted from the start: its narrow definition of ‘religious employer’ reduces religious 
freedom to the freedom of worship by dividing our community between houses of worship and 
ministries of service; its second-class treatment of those great ministries—the so-called 
‘accommodation’—leaves them without adequate relief; and its failure to offer any relief at all 
to for-profit businesses run by so many of our faithful in the pews.”). 
 44. See HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 13 (listing cases that have been 
filed to date). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. Three other cases were dismissed on procedural grounds. 
 47. See infra Parts I.C and I.D for a discussion of these cases. 
 48. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 
134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-354). 
 49. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013) 
(No. 13-356). 
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RFRA.50 Table 1 summarizes how the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court 
have answered these two questions. 
Table 1. Case summary 
 
 
Shareholder 
standing? 
Corporations 
are “persons”? 
Injunction 
granted? 
Circuit cases    
Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius Unresolved Yes Yes 
Korte Yes Yes Yes 
Gilardi Yes No Yes 
O’Brien / Annex Med. Unresolved Unresolved Yes 
Conestoga Wood No No No 
Autocam / Eden Foods No No No 
Supreme Court    
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Yes Yes Yes 
In this Article, I am primarily interested in the topic of corporate personhood, so 
my emphasis will be on how the courts resolved the second issue. Before reviewing 
the reasoning employed in the cases summarized in Table 1, I first examine 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on corporate personhood. This task will help to 
contextualize the debate that drove the circuit split; therefore, it is the focus of the 
following subpart. Only once that project is complete do I turn my attention to the 
specifics of the contraception mandate decisions. 
B. Legal Theories of Corporate Personhood 
Over the past two hundred years, three distinct theories of corporate personhood 
have influenced U.S. legal doctrine. Those theories are (1) the artificial entity 
theory, (2) the aggregate entity theory, and (3) the real entity theory. Under the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012)). The Act was passed to roll 
back the Supreme Court decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In 
Smith, the Court held that neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 885. The public’s outrage over this decision 
motivated Congress to pass the RFRA. In the RFRA, Congress forced the Supreme Court to 
return to its earlier Free Exercise standard known as the Sherbert test. See § 2(b), 107 Stat. at 
1488. The Sherbert test was first articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and 
later reapplied in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For laws burdening religion, the 
Sherbert test requires the government to show (1) that it is acting to further a “compelling 
state interest” and (2) that the state interest cannot be achieved by a less burdensome law. 
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403–09. The Supreme Court found that the RFRA is 
unconstitutional with respect to its application against state and local governments. See City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). However, the RFRA is still valid as applied 
to federal laws. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 424 (2006). 
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artificial entity theory,51 corporations are treated as inventions of the state. Because 
they owe their existence to the state, corporations have no rights other than those 
explicitly granted in their charters.52 
Under the aggregate entity theory,53 corporations are viewed as collections of 
shareholders.54 Corporate powers and rights are derived not from the state but from 
corporations’ shareholder-creators. 
Finally, under the real entity theory,55 corporations are treated as subjects in 
their own right.56 As creatures distinct from both their shareholders and the state, 
corporations are entitled to exercise their own set of rights. The real entity theory 
maintains that corporations are intentional actors; they are persons, distinct from, 
but nonetheless tied to, their shareholders. This is the strongest form of corporate 
personhood and is the theory that I endorse in this Article. It is also the theory that 
provides the firmest legal support for the decisions holding that corporations are 
“persons” under the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA. In the following sections, 
I will examine each of these theories and the foundational Supreme Court cases 
associated with them. 
1. Artificial Entity Theory 
For much of the nineteenth century, the artificial entity theory dominated.57 
Under this view, corporations were mere creatures of the state. They owed their 
existence to and derived their rights from the government.58 As lifeless, artificial 
entities, they were incapable of exercising religion, engaging in speech, or pursuing 
other “liberty” interests; accordingly, the Court deemed corporations ineligible for 
such constitutional protections.59 In most states, the legislatures had to specifically 
authorize every single case of incorporation.60 Chief Justice Marshall underscored 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. The artificial entity theory is occasionally referred to as the “grant” theory. See, e.g., 
Ron Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: 
From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2006). 
 52. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 53. Less frequently, this theory is called the “contractual” or “associational” theory of 
corporate personhood. See Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal 
Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 136 n.42 (2013). 
 54. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 55. The real entity theory is sometimes referred to as the “natural entity” theory or 
“realism” theory. See Michalski, supra note 53, at 140 n.58. 
 56. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 57. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 205–11. 
 58. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under 
the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 235 (1981) (writing that the corporation started as 
“an entity that the state allowed to be created only as a special privilege”). 
 59. See, e.g., Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) (holding that 
corporations are not guaranteed liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because 
“[t]he liberty referred to in that Amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons”). 
 60. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 129 (3d ed. 2005) 
(noting that corporate charters were initially conceived as “grant[s] of authority from the 
sovereign” and that “charters were statutes . . . doled out one by one” in the early nineteenth 
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this reliance on the state when he defined a corporation as “an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere 
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation 
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”61 
Due in part to this legislative supervision, the resulting special charters were 
narrowly tailored. Corporations were not set up to engage in any and all lawful 
business purposes, as they are today. Instead, their operating domains were 
precisely circumscribed, and the courts were quick to use the ultra vires doctrine to 
strike down any actions taken beyond these limits.62 
Another distinct feature of the artificial entity theory is that corporations were 
thought to provide a primarily public, not private, benefit. Legislators did not view 
themselves as granting charters for the benefit of the incorporating individuals but 
rather believed that corporations would promote the public welfare by serving as 
“socially useful instrument[s] of economic growth.”63 
Under the artificial entity theory, corporations were not persons in any real sense. 
They were guaranteed the rights granted by their charters but little else.64 At first, this 
                                                                                                                 
century). 
 61. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 62.  See Clyde L. Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court 
Decisions, 42 W. VA. L.Q. 179, 184–89 (1936) (discussing Supreme Court cases invoking 
the ultra vires doctrine). For a specific case example, see Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. 
Co., 6 U.S. 127 (1804). Chief Justice Marshall articulates the ultra vires doctrine in the 
following passage: 
Without ascribing to this body, which in its corporate capacity, is the mere 
creature of the act to which it owes its existence, all the qualities and 
disabilities annexed by the common law to ancient institutions of this sort, it 
may correctly be said to be precisely what the incorporating act has made it, to 
derive all its powers from that act, and to be capable of exerting its faculties 
only in the manner which that act authorizes. 
To this source of its being, then, we must recur to ascertain its powers, and 
to determine whether it can complete a contract by such communications as are 
in this record. 
Id. at 167; see also Chewacla Lime-Works v. Dismukes, Frierson & Co., 6 So. 122 (Ala. 
1889) (mining company violated its charter when it engaged in general retail business). 
 63. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 47 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2004) (1970). 
 64. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906) (denying a corporation the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination on the basis that it is only entitled to rights 
granted in its charter: “[T]he corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be 
incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and 
franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its charter. 
Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights 
to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. 
There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it 
has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having chartered a 
corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in the exercise of its sovereignty 
inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused . . . . While 
an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an 
immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and 
franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.”). 
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simply meant that the corporation was protected by the Contracts Clause of the 
Constitution. In the 1819 case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the 
Supreme Court solidified this protection by holding that the state of New Hampshire 
could not invalidate a private contract entered into between Dartmouth College and 
King George III.65 In doing so, the Court ensured that states would be unable to 
terminate contracts to which corporations had validly agreed.66 Corporations had 
been granted the same constitutional right to contract as private individuals. 
Although this case was a large step forward for corporate personhood, it did not 
immediately open the gate for other corporate constitutional rights. Corporations 
did not have First Amendment free speech rights, nor did they have Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures or Fifth 
Amendment protections against double jeopardy, among others.67 The Justices in 
Dartmouth College were concerned with safeguarding the powers that had been 
explicitly granted to corporations by state charters, not with extending more 
indirect constitutional rights to corporate persons.68 Because corporations were not 
viewed as ontologically independent entities, they had no claim to any rights not 
explicitly derived from their charters. As creatures of the state, they were entitled 
only to those protections that the state deigned to grant them.69 In the second half of 
the nineteenth century, this restricted view of corporate personhood gave way to a 
more expansive interpretation known as the aggregate entity theory. 
2. Aggregate Entity Theory 
During the late nineteenth century, corporations were reconceived as objects of 
private, not government, creation.70 Shareholders replaced states as the providers of 
corporate rights and privileges.71 Corporations had become collective entities that 
derived their powers from the individuals who comprised them. This conception 
underscored the necessity of human action in both forming and running 
corporations. Corporations were no longer artificial entities tightly controlled by 
states; they were now aggregate entities whose rights were extensions of their 
human creators’ rights.72 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. See 17 U.S. at 657–59 (holding that the land grant by King George III to Dartmouth 
College is a “contract, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States,” and 
therefore cannot be impaired by state law). 
 66. See id. at 666. 
 67. See infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.  
 68. See Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 636. 
 69. See id. at 712 (Story, J., concurring) (observing the authority of the state to “reserve” 
power for itself and prevent corporations from acting beyond the scope of their charters). 
 70. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate 
Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985) (“Gradually, by making the corporate form 
universally available, free incorporation undermined the grant theory. Incorporation 
eventually came to be regarded not as a special state-conferred privilege but as a normal and 
regular mode of doing business.”). 
 71. See id. at 181–82. 
 72. See 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1, at 
3 (2d ed. 1886) (“[T]he rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights 
and duties of the persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”); Millon, supra note 
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Under this new theory, states loosened many of the economic restrictions that 
were characteristic of the artificial entity period of corporate personhood. Most 
notably, the ultra vires doctrine lost much of its force.73 States also shifted from 
passing special charters for each instance of incorporation to a general charter 
system in which people could register corporations for nearly any legal purpose. 
This led to the practice, still in use today, of chartering corporations to engage in 
any lawful business activity.74 
Another major expansion of rights came in 1910 when the Supreme Court 
overturned the longstanding rule that corporations could only conduct business in the 
state in which they were chartered.75 During this period, states also abolished 
capitalization limits and began allowing corporations to own shares of other 
corporations, both actions paving the way for the emergence of the large corporate 
entities of today.76 By the 1930s, the transition away from the artificial entity theory 
had been largely completed, and the public welfare aspects of corporate law had been 
discarded.77 Corporate law was now thoroughly within the domain of private law, and 
with this transition came new constitutional protections for corporate persons. 
The seminal cases defining corporate personhood in this period are Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. and Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining 
& Drilling Co. v. Pennsylvania. In the 1886 case of Santa Clara, the Supreme 
Court infamously concluded that corporations are persons for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.78 Although this case was resolved on other grounds, the 
Chief Justice nonetheless addressed the issue of corporate personhood. In the court 
reporter, he is quoted as saying: “The court does not wish to hear argument on the 
question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 
which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it 
does.”79 Despite providing no reasons to support its conclusion that corporations 
                                                                                                                 
57, at 211 (“The conception of the corporation as an artificial creation entirely dependent on the 
state for its powers gradually gave way to the view that corporations are the natural products of 
individual initiative and possess powers conferred by their constituent shareholders.”). 
 73. Horwitz, supra note 70, at 186–87 (noting that “[b]y 1930, the ultra vires doctrine 
was, if not dead, substantially eroded in practice”). 
 74. See WILLIAM J. GRANGE, CORPORATION LAW FOR OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 44–45 
(1935) (“The modern statutes . . . in describing the purposes for which corporations may be 
formed, use such general phrases as ‘for any lawful business purpose or purposes’ or ‘to 
promote or conduct any legitimate objects or purposes.’ By these statutes, persons forming a 
corporation are in effect invited to adopt for the corporation an unlimited range of 
permissible business activity.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 75. See S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 416–17 (1910); see also Ludwig v. W. 
Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146, 164 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 
56, 65–66 (1910) (White, J., concurring); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 
U.S. 1, 18 (1910). 
 76. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550–54 & nn.5–26 (1933) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “[l]imitation upon the amount of the authorized capital of business 
corporations was long universal,” listing historical state statutes mandating capitalization 
limits, and observing the recent trend towards abolishing these limits). 
 77. See Millon, supra note 57, at 203. 
 78. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). 
 79. Id. 
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are persons, the Santa Clara Court paved the way for future cases to declare the 
matter “well settled.”80 From that point on, corporations would have the 
constitutional rights of due process and equal protection under the laws. 
In Pembina, decided two years after Santa Clara, the Court explicitly affirmed 
the aggregate entity theory of corporate personhood for the first time, writing that 
“[u]nder the designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is 
included. Such corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a 
special purpose . . . .”81 Relying upon the theory of personhood endorsed in 
Pembina, the Supreme Court quickly conferred additional constitutional 
protections on corporations, granting them Fifth Amendment due process 
protections in 189382 and Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures in 1909.83 
Despite this influx of new rights, many constitutional protections still remained 
beyond the grasp of the corporation. Under the aggregate entity theory, 
corporations were only capable of possessing rights that could be attributed to a 
collection of individuals. This meant that corporations were still ineligible for 
“purely personal” protections,84 such as the privilege against self-incrimination85 or  
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. See Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897) (“It is well 
settled that corporations are persons within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States. The rights and securities guaranteed to persons by that 
instrument cannot be disregarded in respect to these artificial entities called corporations any 
more than they can be in respect to the individuals who are the equitable owners of the 
property belonging to such corporations.” (citations omitted)); Covington & Lexington Tpk. 
Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) (“It is now well settled that corporations are 
persons within the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding the deprivation of 
property without due process of law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 81. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 
(1888). Courts of appeals had previously endorsed the aggregate entity theory, such as in the 
Ninth Circuit’s Railroad Tax Cases, which stated that “[t]o deprive the corporation of its 
property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property or to lessen 
its value . . . . [T]he courts will look through the ideal entity and name of the corporation to 
the persons who compose it, and protect them, though the process be in its name.” 13 F. 722, 
747–48 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882). 
 82. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 176–77 (1893) (invalidating 
the Secretary of Interior’s attempt “to deprive the plaintiff [corporation] of its property 
without due process of law”). 
 83. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (holding that a corporation is “entitled to 
immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and 
endorsing the aggregate entity theory by stating that “[a] corporation is, after all, but an 
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In 
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to 
such body.” (emphasis in original)). 
 84. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (“Certain 
‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are 
unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the 
particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.” (quoting United States 
v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–701 (1944))). 
 85. White, 322 U.S. at 699 (“Since the privilege against self-incrimination is a purely 
personal one, it cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.”). 
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the free exercise of religion.86 
Although the aggregate entity theory yielded many gains for corporations, it was 
soon challenged by an even more expansive conception of corporate personhood—
the real entity theory of the firm. I trace this view in the following section. Unlike 
the aggregate entity theory, the real entity theory acknowledges the corporate 
person as an intentional agent in its own right. 
3. Real Entity Theory 
In the early twentieth century, the real entity theory emerged as an alternative to 
the aggregate entity theory.87 This theory frames corporations as entities that are 
independently deserving of constitutional protections.88 They derive their rights 
from neither the state nor their constituent shareholders. Under the real entity 
theory, corporations are real persons with real rights.89 Proponents of this view 
argue that the state is powerless to create corporations. All that the state can do is 
“recognize, or refuse to recognize” their existence.90 As one scholar put it, 
The law can no more create [a corporation] than it can create a house 
out of a collection of loose bricks. If the bricks are put together so as to 
form a house, the law can refuse to recognize the existence of that 
house—can act as if it did not exist; but the law has nothing whatever 
to do with putting the bricks together in such a way that, if the law is 
not to shut its eyes to facts, it must recognize that a house exists and not 
merely a number of bricks.91 
Legal theorists who advanced the real entity theory were heavily influenced by 
philosophical accounts of ontological emergence, the idea that a superordinate 
being springs forth when individuals form a collective.92 Despite the supernatural 
foundations of real entity theory, it has managed to influence court doctrine. Its 
effects have been most apparent in the area of corporate criminal liability. The 
seminal case on the matter is New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 408 (E.D. Pa. 
2013) (calling the Free Exercise Clause a “uniquely ‘human’” and “purely personal” right); see 
also Millon, supra note 57, at 231 (writing that supporters of the aggregate entity theory 
maintain that regulations “lack legitimacy” when they “intrude upon individual autonomy”). 
 87. See Horwitz, supra note 70, at 179. 
 88. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational 
Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 295 (1990) (The real entity theory maintains that a 
corporation is “an organic social reality with an existence independent of, and constituting 
something more than, its changing shareholders.”); Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of 
Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 892 
(2012) (This theory “sees the corporation, not as an extension of the state or of its many 
constituencies, but as having a separate identity independent of both.”). 
 89. See W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 L.Q. 
REV. 365, 370 (1905). 
 90. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 260 (1911). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See infra Part III.B. 
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United States.93 Decided by the Supreme Court in 1909, this case is notable for 
holding that corporations themselves can be subject to criminal sanctions.94 
More recent cases have taken this doctrine even further by holding that 
corporations can be guilty of crimes that require a mens rea.95 In 1939, a 
corporation was convicted of conspiring to defraud the U.S. government by 
obtaining payment for goods that were not delivered in full.96 Conspiracy, at its 
heart, requires the perpetrators to be intentional agents. Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines conspiracy as “[a]n agreement by two or more persons to commit an 
unlawful act, coupled with an intent to achieve the agreement’s objective.”97 As the 
definition shows, it would be impossible for a party to engage in a conspiracy if 
that party were not an intentional agent. Try to imagine yourself committing a 
conspiracy with your car to rob a bank or a conspiracy with your gym bag to 
distribute narcotics. It just isn’t possible. You can, however, envision someone 
engaging in a conspiracy with a corporation. Indeed, the courts have routinely held 
that corporations possess the necessary intent to engage in criminal conspiracies.98 
In another case, the Fourth Circuit upheld a jury’s finding that the Old 
Monastery Company had engaged in a conspiracy to violate the Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942 by attempting to sell alcohol at prices in excess of the 
maximum established by the Act.99 More recently, in 1985, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed a corporation’s conviction for conspiracy and for making and using false 
documents in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.100 These cases are 
representative of the many others in which corporations have been held criminally 
liable for their intentional actions. 
As these cases illustrate, the real entity theory supports the idea that 
“[c]orporations can act and be at fault in ways that are different from the ways in 
which their members can act and be at fault.”101 As persons in their own right, they 
are capable of having beliefs and desires that differ from the beliefs and desires of 
their constituent members. 
Unfortunately, courts and scholars that have previously endorsed the real entity 
theory have failed to provide strong metaphysical support for their claims. In Parts 
II through IV, I attempt to rectify this problem. Drawing upon recent work in group 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 94. Id. at 493 (“We think that a corporation may be liable criminally for certain offenses 
of which a specific intent may be a necessary element.” (quoting Telegram Newspaper Co. 
v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 297 (1899))). 
 95. See generally Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate 
Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 103–10 (discussing how nonhuman entities can be 
guilty of human crimes). 
 96. Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939). 
 97. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 375 (10th ed. 2014). 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming the 
conviction of the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA corporation for conspiracy to 
violate the Animal Enterprise Protection Act); C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85 
(9th Cir. 1945) (upholding the conviction of the C.I.T. Corporation for conspiracy to make 
and pass a false statement for purposes of influencing the Federal Housing Administration). 
 99. Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945). 
 100. United States v. Automated Med. Labs. Inc., 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 101. See Eric Colvin, Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability, 6 CRIM. L.F. 1, 2 (1995). 
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agency, I argue that it is right to conceive of corporations as real persons who act 
independently of their human agents. But first, I return to the contraception 
mandate cases and examine how the courts of appeals have applied corporate 
personhood doctrine to their present analyses. 
C. Cases Denying Injunction 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services is the leading case denying plaintiffs injunctive relief 
from the contraception mandate.102 As such, it makes sense to start there. This 
Third Circuit case was brought by the Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation 
and its shareholder-owners, the Hahn family. As members of the Mennonite 
religion, the Hahn family believes “that taking of life which includes anything that 
terminates a fertilized embryo is intrinsic evil and a sin against God to which they 
are held accountable.”103 The plaintiffs further believe that it is “immoral and sinful 
for [them] to intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or otherwise support 
these drugs.”104 Accordingly, the Hahn family sought relief from the contraception 
mandate, claiming it infringed upon their free exercise rights. 
As the Third Circuit noted, the question presented was “whether Conestoga, a 
for-profit, secular corporation, can exercise religion.”105 The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that religious corporations can exercise religion,106 so the 
emphasis here was on the “for-profit, secular” part of the equation. The Hahn 
family presented two theories to explain how the corporation can exercise religion: 
(1) directly, as an independent entity; and (2) indirectly, by adopting the religious 
beliefs of its owners.107 
These two arguments should call to mind the real entity theory and the aggregate 
entity theory, respectively.108 In the first argument, the Hahn family appeals to 
Citizens United, the case that established broad First Amendment free speech rights 
for corporations.109 In particular, the Citizens United Court held that “the 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s 
corporate identity.”110 Here, the Court strongly endorsed the real entity theory, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. 724 F.3d 377, 389 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 103. Id. at 381–82. 
 104. Id. at 382. 
 105. Id. at 383. 
 106. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
525 (1993) (holding that a “not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law” succeeded 
on its free exercise claim); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (Courts have 
long “recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by 
the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the 
exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an 
indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.” (emphasis added)).  
 107. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 383. 
 108. See supra Parts I.B.3 & I.B.2. 
 109. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 110. Id. at 365. 
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the Hahn family wished to apply this theory to the Free Exercise Clause. The Third 
Circuit, however, was unwilling. Instead, the appellate court chose to adopt the 
artificial entity theory of corporate personhood. Quoting Dartmouth College, the 
court stated that a corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law.”111 This led the Third Circuit to conclude 
that corporations are ineligible for free exercise protections because they have no 
independent existence.112 
To further buttress its claim, the Third Circuit appealed to First National Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti.113 In that case, the Supreme Court held that “[c]ertain ‘purely 
personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 
are unavailable to corporations and other organizations.”114 To the Third Circuit, it 
was undeniable that religion was another “purely personal” guarantee. The majority 
wrote that “[r]eligious belief takes shape within the minds and hearts of individuals, 
and its protection is one of the more uniquely ‘human’ rights provided by the 
Constitution.”115 Therefore, an artificial profit-seeking corporation would obviously 
be ineligible for protection under the Free Exercise Clause. 
Next, the Court turned to the Hahn family’s second argument. Recall that this 
argument appealed to the aggregate entity theory, claiming that shareholders 
exercise their religious rights through corporations. This line of reasoning, known 
as the pass-through theory, was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in two cases. First, in 
EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co., the Ninth Circuit held that 
secular, for-profit corporations can assert free exercise claims on behalf of their 
owners.116 The court reasoned that, because “Townley is merely the instrument 
through and by which [the shareholders] express their religious beliefs,” it was 
eligible to advance the free exercise claims of its shareholders.117 The Townley 
court declined to decide whether a corporation could sue to protect its own 
independent free exercise rights, finding the answer to that question unnecessary 
for resolving the case.118 
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the pass-through theory in Stormans, Inc. v. 
Selecky.119 The facts of this case are quite similar to the facts in Conestoga. In 
Stormans, a pharmacy brought a free exercise challenge to a state regulation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y, Inc. v. Pataki, 
292 F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir. 2002)), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 112. Id. at 385. 
 113. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 114. Id. at 778 n.14. 
 115. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 385 (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2013)). 
 116. 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988) (In this case, a private corporation sought an exemption 
from a provision within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that required it to accommodate 
employees who objected to attending the company’s compulsory devotional services.). 
 117. Id. at 619. 
 118. Id. at 619–20 (It is “unnecessary to address the abstract issue whether a for profit 
corporation has rights under the Free Exercise Clause independent of those of its 
shareholders and officers.”). 
 119. 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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requiring it to dispense Plan B (i.e., the morning-after pill). As in Townley, the 
Ninth Circuit adopted the aggregate entity theory, holding that the corporation is 
“an extension of the beliefs of members of the Stormans family, and that the beliefs 
of the Stormans family are the beliefs of” the pharmacy.120 Therefore, the 
corporation has “standing to assert the free exercise rights of its owners.”121 Like in 
Townley, the Ninth Circuit declined to reach the question of whether corporations 
can assert their own free exercise claims. 
In Conestoga, the Third Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s pass-through theory 
and, consequently, the aggregate entity theory of corporate personhood. Instead, the 
Third Circuit reiterated its support for the artificial entity theory, arguing that “[i]t is a 
fundamental principle that ‘incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal 
entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of 
the natural individuals who created’ the corporation.”122 Lest this be taken as an 
endorsement of the real entity theory, Conestoga also stated that “[g]eneral business 
corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions or belief systems of their 
individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, 
observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart 
from the intention and direction of their individual actors.”123 With that, the court 
found the matter settled. In the Third Circuit’s view, for-profit corporations should 
not be eligible for protection under the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.124 
The only other court of appeals to deny an injunction is the Sixth Circuit. This 
court addressed the contraception mandate in two cases: Autocam Corp. v. 
Sebelius125 and Eden Food, Inc. v. Sebelius.126 The Autocam suit was brought by 
the Kennedy family, the owners of Autocam Corporation and Autocam Medical, 
LLC. As in Conestoga, the plaintiffs were devout Christians who “believe that they 
are called to live out the teachings of Christ in their daily activity and witness to the 
truth of the Gospel by treating others in a manner that reflects their commitment to 
human dignity.”127 The Kennedy family treats the corporations as one “form 
through which [they] endeavor to live their vocation as Christians in the world.”128 
The plaintiffs contended that the government infringed on their religious beliefs by 
forcing them to provide health insurance that covers artificial contraception.129 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. Id. at 1120. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 387 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 
158, 163 (2001)), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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1291 (W.D. Okla. 2012)). 
 124. See id. at 388 (“We hold—contrary to Townley and Stormans—that the free exercise 
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 125. 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014) (mem.). 
 126. 733 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014) (mem.). 
 127. Autocam, 730 F.3d at 620. 
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 129. Id. at 621. 
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Because failure to comply with the mandate would lead to fines of nearly nineteen 
million dollars per year, the Kennedys had no choice but to seek an exemption.130 
Relying heavily on Conestoga, the Sixth Circuit denied the Kennedy family’s 
request for a preliminary injunction.131 Just as the Third Circuit had found free exercise 
to be a “purely personal” right, the Sixth Circuit deemed the Free Exercise Clause to be 
an “individual” right that “defines nothing less than the respective relationships in our 
constitutional democracy of the individual to government and to God.”132 
Just a month after Autocam, the Sixth Circuit denied a preliminary injunction 
on similar grounds in the case of Eden Foods.133 Here, the court ruled that, 
because “a secular, for-profit corporation[] cannot establish that it can exercise 
religion,” such corporations are ineligible for protection under the Free Exercise 
Clause or the RFRA.134 The Sixth Circuit’s denial of corporate intentionality is 
again in line with the artificial entity theory. In the next subpart, I focus on those 
courts that endorsed a stronger theory of corporate personhood and, ultimately, 
granted a preliminary injunction. 
D. Cases Granting Injunction 
I begin this subpart with Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, since it is far and away the 
best-known contraception mandate case.135 The facts of this case are quite 
straightforward. Hobby Lobby is a chain of arts-and-crafts stores with over five 
hundred locations and thirteen thousand employees. The company is a closely held 
for-profit business that was organized as an S corporation.136 David Green, Hobby 
Lobby’s founder, intended for his company to be run according to Christian 
doctrine, and so his family, which still owns and operates the business today, set 
out to promote that mission.137 This religious commitment is evidenced in many of 
Hobby Lobby’s actions and decisions. For instance, Hobby Lobby is closed on 
Sundays and purchases newspaper ads encouraging people to “know Jesus as Lord 
and Savior.”138 Additionally, Hobby Lobby’s mission statement affirms the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 625 (“In this case, we agree with the government that Autocam is not a 
‘person’ capable of ‘religious exercise’ as intended by RFRA and affirm the district court's 
judgment on this basis.”). 
 132. Id. at 627 (emphasis in original) (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 577 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment)). 
 133. Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. 
Ct. 2902 (2014) (mem.). 
 134. Id. at 633. 
 135. See, e.g., Mark Oppenheimer, At Christian Companies, Religious Principles 
Complement Business Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2013, at A14 (predicting that the 
Hobby Lobby “challenge to the Affordable Care Act will surely go to the Supreme Court”). 
 136. An S corporation is a closely held corporation that passes through its income or loss 
to its shareholders, who then must declare the income or loss on their individual tax returns. 
See 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012). 
 137. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d 
sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 138. Id. 
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company’s commitment to “[h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the 
company in a manner consistent with biblical principles.”139 Of particular 
importance to the contraception issue is the Green family’s belief that it is against 
their religion to “facilitate any act that causes the death of a human embryo.”140 
This is where the conflict with the contraception mandate began. The Green 
family argued that being forced to provide their employees with insurance that covers 
morning-after pills, such as Plan B and Ella, would violate their free exercise rights. 
If the plaintiffs had refused to provide such contraception coverage, they would have 
been subject to an annual fine of $475 million.141 The district court found in favor of 
the government and refused to grant an injunction.142 However, on appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit reversed, finding that Hobby Lobby was likely to succeed on the merits and, 
accordingly, that an injunction should be granted.143 
As to the specific issues, the court of appeals found that Hobby Lobby was a 
“person” for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA and therefore had 
standing to challenge the mandate in its own right.144 Having settled this issue, the 
court found it unnecessary to decide whether, as shareholders, the Green family had 
standing to challenge the mandate.145 
In contrast to the cases denying injunctive relief,146 the Tenth Circuit held that 
“the Free Exercise Clause is not a ‘“purely personal” guarantee[] . . . unavailable to 
corporations and other organizations.’”147 The Court did not believe that “the 
‘historic function’ of the [Free Exercise Clause] has been limited to the protection 
of individuals.”148 The Tenth Circuit based its decision on two premises. 
First, the Supreme Court has previously “recognized a right to associate for the 
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, 
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The 
Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means 
of preserving other individual liberties.”149 In particular, the Supreme Court has ruled 
that the Free Exercise Clause extends to nonprofit corporations.150 The second premise 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. Our Company, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/our_company. 
 140. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122. 
 141. Id. at 1125. 
 142. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1296–97 (W.D. Okla. 
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114, aff’d sub nom. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751. 
 143. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1145. 
 144. Id. at 1126. 
 145. Id. at 1121. 
 146. See supra Part I.C. 
 147. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1133 (emphasis in original) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)). 
 148. Id. at 1133–34 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14). 
 149. Id. at 1133 (emphasis in original) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
618 (1984)). 
 150. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
525, 547 (1993) (finding that free exercise rights extend to a not-for-profit corporation 
incorporated in Florida); see also Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49 (1815) 
(Story, J.) (“[The] legislature may . . . enable all sects to accomplish the great objects of 
religion by giving them corporate rights for the management of their property, and the 
regulation of their temporal as well as spiritual concerns.”). 
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endorsed by the Tenth Circuit is that the Supreme Court has held that individuals do 
not lose their free exercise rights when they engage in for-profit activities.151 
From these two premises, the Tenth Circuit reached the conclusion that closely 
held, for-profit corporations can have free exercise rights.152 This seems like a 
reasonable extension of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Free Exercise Clause is 
available to nonprofit corporations, and it is available to people who engage in 
for-profit activities. Why should it not be available to for-profit corporations? 
Indeed, this line of reasoning was also persuasive to the Seventh Circuit in Korte 
v. Sebelius.153 The facts of this case are similar to Hobby Lobby. Cyril and Jane 
Korte are the owners and operators of Korte & Luitjohan Contractors, Inc., an 
Illinois construction company. The Kortes are Catholic and run their company 
according to their religious beliefs. Like the Green family in Hobby Lobby, the 
Kortes maintain that providing their employees with insurance that covers 
morning-after pills would violate their religious beliefs.154 The Kortes held this 
belief so strongly that they incorporated it into their company’s ethical guidelines: 
“As adherents of the Catholic faith, we hold to the teachings of the Catholic Church 
regarding the sanctity of human life from conception to natural death. We believe 
that actions intended to terminate an innocent human life by abortion, including 
abortion-inducing drugs, are gravely sinful.”155 Failure to comply with the 
contraception mandate would subject the Kortes to an annual penalty of seventeen 
million dollars.156 In an effort to avoid such a harsh fine, the Kortes brought suit 
seeking an exemption. 
The Seventh Circuit began its inquiry by appealing to the Dictionary Act.157 
This Act states, “In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the 
context indicates otherwise[,] . . . the word[] ‘person’ . . . include[s] 
corporations . . . .”158 From here, the Seventh Circuit examined earlier cases 
involving free exercise claims by religious corporations. They found that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. The Tenth Circuit relied upon United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), and 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In Lee, the Court considered the free exercise 
claim of an Amish employer who argued it was against his religion to pay Social Security 
taxes for his employees. The Court ruled against the Amish employer but did not do so 
because he was engaged in a for-profit enterprise. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257–61. In Braunfeld, 
Jewish merchants claimed that Sunday closing laws violated their free exercise rights. The 
Court held against the merchants, but as in Lee, it did not do so because the merchants were 
running for-profit businesses. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600–09. 
 152. In addition to drawing this syllogistic conclusion, the Tenth Circuit also drew 
analogues to the Supreme Court’s freedom of speech jurisprudence. At one point, the Court 
stated, “We see no reason the Supreme Court would recognize constitutional protection for a 
corporation’s political expression but not its religious expression.” Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 
1135 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342–55 (2010)). 
 153. 735 F.3d 654 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2903 (2014). 
 154. Id. at 662–63. 
 155. Id. at 663 n.5. 
 156. Id. at 664. 
 157. The Dictionary Act contains general definitions and rules of construction that apply 
to the United States Code. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2110 (2002). 
 158. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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Supreme Court has consistently granted free exercise rights to religious 
corporations,159 observing that 
[i]t’s common ground that nonprofit religious corporations exercise 
religion in the sense that their activities are religiously motivated. So 
unless there is something disabling about mixing profit-seeking and 
religious practice, it follows that a faith-based, for-profit corporation 
can claim free-exercise protection to the extent that an aspect of its 
conduct is religiously motivated.160 
Next, the Seventh Circuit determined that individuals retain their free exercise 
rights when engaged in for-profit activities.161 Putting these two premises 
together, the court of appeals concluded that there is, in fact, nothing disabling 
about mixing profit-seeking and religious practice.162 Therefore, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the “corporate plaintiffs are ‘persons’ under RFRA and may 
invoke the statute’s protection.”163 
A more recent case to raise the contraception mandate issue is Gilardi v. U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services.164 Again, the facts are similar to Hobby 
Lobby and Korte, so they do not bear repeating.165 However, the legal outcome is 
slightly different. Whereas the previous two cases that granted injunctions ruled 
both that the shareholders had standing to sue and that the corporation is a “person” 
under the RFRA, in Gilardi, the D.C. Circuit affirmed shareholder standing but 
denied corporate personhood.166 Unlike the Tenth and Seventh Circuits, the D.C. 
Circuit did not feel comfortable combining two separate streams of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence to find a free exercise right for for-profit corporations. Instead, the 
D.C. Circuit merely searched for prior case law explicitly allowing for-profit 
corporations to advance free exercise claims. Finding none, the court of appeals 
held that only religious organizations are entitled to free exercise protections in 
their own right.167 The shareholders, however, did have standing to sue, and so the 
injunction was granted. 
The fourth and final court of appeals to grant an injunction was the Eighth Circuit. 
Unfortunately, its opinions do not cast any light on the issue of corporate personhood. 
In O’Brien v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, the court of appeals filed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. The Seventh Circuit relied heavily on Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 160. Korte, 735 F.3d at 679 (emphasis in original). 
 161. Like Hobby Lobby, the court in Korte relied upon Lee and Braunfeld. See id. at 680. 
 162. See id. at 680–81. 
 163. Id. at 666 (The court also held that “the contraception mandate substantially burdens 
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 164. 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014). 
 165. For a restatement of the facts, see id. at 1210. 
 166. Id. at 1214. 
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an order that stated in its entirety, “Appellants’ motion for stay pending appeal has 
been considered by the court, and the motion is granted. Judge Arnold dissents.”168 In 
Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, the Eighth Circuit provided little more justification for 
its decision, simply citing to the O’Brien decision as precedent.169 
The final word on the matter came a few months later when the Supreme Court 
ruled on Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.170 This case was a consolidation of 
the Third Circuit Conestoga case and the Tenth Circuit Hobby Lobby case. In its 
opinion, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were eligible for an exemption 
from the contraception mandate.171 More broadly, the majority ruled that closely 
held for-profit corporations are entitled to free exercise protections under the 
RFRA.172 The Supreme Court’s justification was identical to that adopted by the 
Seventh and Tenth Circuits. Reviewing precedent, the Court found that both 
nonprofit corporations and profit-seeking individuals receive protection under the 
Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA.173 Because neither corporate status nor 
profit-seeking nature disqualifies one from religious protections, the majority 
concluded that mixing the two characteristics should not be disqualifying.174 
Having reviewed these decisions, I want to draw particular attention to one point. 
As opposed to the circuit courts that denied injunctive relief, neither these courts of 
appeals nor the Supreme Court directly confronted the issue of corporate intentions or 
beliefs. By and large, these courts remained agnostic. Hobby Lobby and Korte did 
find that closely held, for-profit corporations could sue to protect the religious 
interests of their shareholders. However, they did not determine whether for-profit 
corporations could make a free exercise claim independent of the existence of unified 
religious beliefs among their shareholders. Such a ruling would have spoken to 
whether large public corporations can advance free exercise claims of their own. 
In Parts II, III, and IV, I draw upon the philosophical literature on personhood and 
group agency to argue for a strong form of corporate personhood, one that would 
grant corporations free exercise protections so long as their beliefs are sincerely held. 
The extensive philosophical work on this topic provides substantial evidence for the 
claim that corporations are “persons” in their own right. This literature also shows 
how corporations can have their own beliefs, desires, intentions, and other mental 
states, independent of the people who animate them. This claim goes against the 
dominant legal paradigms of the day;175 however, it is consistent with and, indeed, 
derived from the prevailing philosophical theories of the day. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. No. 12-3357 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets
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II. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF PERSONHOOD 
Two competing theories of personhood have dominated the philosophical 
literature. The first account maintains that persons are distinguished by certain 
intrinsic characteristics, that there is some innate substance that captures 
personhood. This theory is known as the “intrinsicist account.”176 The second 
theory holds that persons are distinguished by certain external characteristics. 
According to this account, any agent that performs in a certain manner qualifies as 
a person. This second theory is known as the “performative account.”177 In short, 
the debate between these two positions centers on whether persons are defined by 
what they are (intrinsicist) or by what they do (performative).178 
For much of history, the intrinsicist conception of personhood was the dominant 
position in philosophy. The first person to clearly lay out this account was 
Boethius, a Christian philosopher who lived during the sixth century.179 Boethius 
offered a now classic formulation of the intrinsicist theory when he wrote that a 
person is “an individual substance of a rational nature: naturae rationalis individua 
substantia.”180 Notably, in his Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas adopted 
Boethius’s definition of “persons.”181 Given Aquinas’s endorsement, it is 
unsurprising that many later philosophers have taken up this view. Perhaps one of 
the most important to do so was Descartes, who advanced a similar conception of 
personhood while developing his theory of mind-body dualism.182 In the following 
passage, taken from Descartes’s Sixth Meditation, he famously sets forth an 
argument for the existence of rational substance (“minds”) independent of bodies: 
Next I examined attentively what I was. I saw that while I could 
pretend that I had no body and that there was no world and no place for 
me to be in, I could not for all that pretend that I did not exist. I saw on 
the contrary that from the mere fact that I thought of doubting the truth 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, 
AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 171 (2011) (According to the intrinsicist conception of 
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Harvard University Press 1918) (512). 
 181. See 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA question 29, art. 1, at 161–63 
(Mortimer J. Adler ed., Laurence Shapcote trans., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1994). 
 182. See LIST & PETTIT, supra note 176, at 170–72 (comparing Descartes’s res cogitans 
to the intrinsicist conception of personhood). 
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of other things, it followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed; 
whereas if I had merely ceased thinking, even if everything else I had 
ever imagined had been true, I should have had no reason to believe 
that I existed. From this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence 
or nature is simply to think, and which does not require any place, or 
depend on any material thing, in order to exist.183 
In the above passage, Descartes writes that he can doubt the existence of the 
material world but cannot doubt his existence as a thinking thing. From these 
observations, Descartes concludes that there must be two fundamental substances: 
one that gives rise to the mental world and one that gives rise to the physical world. 
This viewpoint is traditionally called “substance dualism” or “Cartesian 
dualism.”184 In this tradition, the mental substance (normally likened to an 
ephemeral soul) is at the heart of personhood. If a body is animated by mental 
substance, it is a person; if a body is governed by the purely physical world, as a 
mechanical clock is guided by springs, it is not a person. 
The first major figure to offer an alternative, performative conception of 
personhood was Thomas Hobbes.185 Hobbes’s definition of “person” is built on 
materialism, a philosophical theory founded on the idea that the only things that 
exist are material substances and that all phenomena are caused by the interactions 
of material substances.186 In other words, mental substance does not exist. 
Everything is caused by and can be explained in reference to the purely material 
world. Hobbes offers several critiques of incorporeal souls, one of which comes in 
the following passage from Leviathan: 
All other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. 
One when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by 
definition; whereof there have been abundance coined by Schoolmen, 
and puzzled philosophers. 
Another, when men make a name of two names, whose 
significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an 
incorporeal body, or, which is all one, an incorporeal substance, and a 
great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two 
names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signify 
nothing at all.187 
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Here, Hobbes claims that it is nonsense to talk of incorporeal bodies. The terms 
are paradoxical and, therefore, unintelligible. This argument has been subject to the 
criticism that it presupposes what it seeks to prove (namely that there cannot be 
incorporeal bodies). Fortunately, in De Corpore, Hobbes lays out an additional 
reason for his disbelief in the existence of immaterial substances: 
The gross errors of certain metaphysicians take their origin from this; 
for from the fact that it is possible to consider thinking without 
considering body, they want to infer that there is no need for a thinking 
body; and from the fact that it is possible to consider quantity without 
considering body, they also think that quantity can exist without body 
and body without quantity, so that a quantitative body is made only 
after quantity has been added to a body. These meaningless vocal 
sounds, “abstract substances,” “separated essence,” and other similar 
ones, spring from the same fountain.188 
This passage reads as a direct rebuttal to Descartes. In it, Hobbes maintains that 
our ability to consider thought and body independently does not provide a 
justification for believing that thought can exist without body. After arguing against 
the existence of mental substances, Hobbes turns his attention to developing a 
theory of the mind that does not rest on incorporeal substances. He accomplishes 
this by likening reasoning to computation. “By reasoning,” Hobbes writes, “I 
understand computation.” 
And to compute is to collect the sum of many things added together at 
the same time, or to know the remainder when one thing has been taken 
from another. To reason therefore is the same as to add or to 
subtract . . . . Therefore all reasoning reduces to these two questions of 
the mind, addition and subtraction.189 
Here, Hobbes is arguing that reasoning is a form of computation that can be 
done by purely material entities. It is “nothing but reckoning, that is adding and 
subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and 
signifying of our thoughts.”190 By reducing the mind to a series of computations 
performed by material substances, Hobbes does not have to posit the existence of a 
mental substance to explain thought. Instead, he can maintain that it is caused by 
purely physical interactions. Further, Hobbes believes that the mind and all of the 
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properties associated with it (e.g., reasoning, imagining, sensing, and deliberating) 
can be caused by many different physical systems. As Hobbes writes in Leviathan: 
[W]hy may we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves 
by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what 
is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the 
joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as 
was intended by the artificer?191 
Hobbes’s conception of the mind as nothing more than a “calculating 
machine”192 has proven extremely influential. In recent times, it has served as an 
intellectual foundation for functionalism, a view that has become “the most widely 
held theory of mind among philosophers, cognitive psychologists, and artificial 
intelligence researchers.”193 Proponents of functionalism define a mental state not 
by its internal characteristics but by the way it functions or the role it plays in a 
given cognitive system.194 
As a simple example, take the concept of pain. A functionalist might define pain 
as a state that is brought about by bodily harm, that is unpleasant, and that produces 
a desire within the entity to remove itself from the state.195 According to 
functionalism, only entities with parts that function to produce these pain criteria 
have the capacity to be in pain. 
Crucially, an entity need not have certain physical arrangements to be capable of 
experiencing pain. A silicon-based life form that met the pain criteria would have 
the ability to be in pain. Believing, desiring, fearing, hoping, and every other 
mental state can be represented in this functionalist framework. If an entity has 
certain internal features that cause it to function according to certain belief-state 
criteria or desire-state criteria, then it is appropriate to say the entity has beliefs or 
desires.196 There is a clear analogy between this functionalist account of the mind and 
Hobbes’s performative account of personhood. Just as a mental state is constituted by 
its functional role, a person is constituted by its ability to perform in a certain way. In 
Part IV, I argue that under the functionalist account, corporations have certain mental 
properties that are defining characteristics of personhood (notably the ability to act 
rationally and update their belief states as new information is acquired). Because 
corporations have these properties, they are able to function as persons and therefore 
fulfill the performative conception of personhood. 
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Before reaching that conclusion, however, I must first work my way through the 
philosophical literature on joint intentionality. This body of work will show how it 
is metaphysically possible for corporations to possess any type of mental 
properties, let alone the requisite mental properties to be deemed a person. 
III. JOINT INTENTIONALITY 
“Intentionality” is a philosopher’s term. It is mental directedness, “the power of 
minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of 
affairs.”197 Paradigmatic intentional states include, among others, believing, 
desiring, wanting, fearing, and hoping. One can identify an intentional state by its 
need to be directed toward an object or state of the world.198 
For example, if I have a belief, it must be a belief about something. In order for me 
to have a desire, there must be something that I desire. Likewise, I cannot have fear 
unless there is something or some event that I fear. Nor can I want unless there is 
something that I want. Notably, the object of directedness need not be real. A child 
can fear the boogeyman. A man can believe that aliens abducted him. A young girl 
can tell Santa that she wants a unicorn for Christmas. All of these are valid intentional 
states because they are characterized by their directedness toward something. 
Like the child who fears the bogeyman or the young girl who wants a unicorn, 
corporations, too, can possess intentional states. When we say things like, “Time 
Warner regrets purchasing AOL,” “Amazon wants to build new distribution 
warehouses,” or any of the examples in the introduction,199 we attribute intentional 
states to corporations. In the following subparts, I explore four possible meanings 
of these intentional ascriptions: 
(1) The first is that our ascriptions are not meant to be taken literally. 
Corporations do not actually possess intentional states, and any 
utterance that suggests they do should be understood as a mere 
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linguistic shortcut. 
(2) At the other extreme, one could maintain that the corporation is a 
case of ontological emergence. The corporation does indeed possess 
intentional states, and its intentional states are irreducible with 
respect to what happens at the individual level. 
(3) A middle-ground alternative is that the speaker might simply mean 
that a majority of the members or some crucial subset of that 
corporation (e.g., executives) possesses that intentional state. 
(4) Finally, it is possible that corporations derive their intentionality 
from the actions of their individual members but do not necessarily 
replicate the intentional states of their members or any subset of 
those members. 
Which of these theories we accept will tell us which legal theory of the 
corporation to endorse. After rejecting the first three possibilities, I argue in favor 
of the fourth position and show why this view should lead us to believe that 
corporations satisfy the performative conception of personhood. From accepting 
corporations as persons under the performative conception, it is only a short step to 
adopting the real entity theory of corporate personhood. 
A. Linguistic Shortcut 
When people attribute intentional states to a corporation, they may intend that their 
utterances be understood metaphorically. A proponent of this view would maintain 
that anyone who holds that corporations have intentional states is simply being misled 
by the grammatical nuances of our language. In other words, when we make these 
ascriptions, “[w]e create a metaphysics out of an accident of metaphor.”200 
The corporation does not actually possess intentional states, but speaking as if it 
does allows one to transmit information more quickly. After all, it is easier to say 
“Microsoft wants to unveil a new operating system next month” than “Certain 
members of the Microsoft Corporation who have the requisite decision-making 
authority within the company want certain company employees to unveil a new 
operating system next month.” 
Despite the superficial appeal of this explanation, abduction provides a strong 
reason for us to doubt that our ascriptions of intentional states to corporations are 
purely metaphorical. Abductive reasoning is a type of logical inference that 
privileges explanatory power.201 The process is frequently referred to as “inference 
to the best explanation.”202 
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To see how abduction works in practice, consider the following example.203 You 
wake up one morning and head downstairs to pour yourself a bowl of Cheerios. 
Upon entering the kitchen, you find a plate with breadcrumbs and a jar of peanut 
butter and jelly sitting on the counter. From this, you infer that your roommate got 
home late and made a peanut butter and jelly sandwich before heading to bed, too 
tired to clean up the mess. This explanation could very well be wrong. Perhaps a 
robber broke into your house and decided to have a snack before fleeing the crime 
scene. Maybe you experienced an episode of sleepwalking in which you made 
yourself a sandwich before returning to bed. Although these alternative 
explanations are possible, you believe it is more probable that your roommate made 
the sandwich. By accepting this version of events, you have made an inference to 
the best explanation. You could be wrong, but because this explanation best fits the 
available evidence, you infer that it is true. 
A standard formulation of abduction reads as follows: 
Given evidence E and candidate explanations H1, . . . , Hn of E, infer the 
truth of that Hi which best explains E.204 
In our example, you took in all the available evidence regarding the situation 
(perhaps this included the fact that nothing was stolen from your house, you have 
never sleepwalked before, and your roommate really likes peanut butter and jelly 
sandwiches), considered the various hypotheses, and determined that your roommate 
having made the sandwich is the hypothesis which best explains the evidence. 
As this example shows, we engage in abduction every day; our proclivity for 
inferring the truth of a hypothesis based on the available evidence is so strong that 
we frequently do not even realize we are performing abductive reasoning. As we 
used abduction to infer that your roommate made a sandwich, so, too, can we use 
abduction to infer that corporate intentionality is not the product of a linguistic 
shortcut. Abduction cannot definitively show that our ascriptions are not 
metaphors, but it can provide strong evidence that our ascriptions should be 
understood nonmetaphorically. 
The key piece of evidence here is that our interactions with corporations suggest 
that they possess intentionality. This is most obvious in our frequent attributions of 
moral blame to corporations.205 It would make no sense to hold a corporation 
morally responsible for its actions if a corporation could not intend to commit its 
actions. Attributing moral blame to an intentionless corporation would be no 
different than attributing moral blame to a toaster that overcooked your toast. 
At this point, one might object that we do not actually hold corporations morally 
responsible. Instead, this is just another example of the linguistic shortcut at work. 
When we ascribe blame to a corporation, we are merely indicating that certain 
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members of the corporation have acted in a blameworthy manner.206 However, this 
understanding does not fit with our legal treatment of corporations. Companies 
themselves are frequently brought up on criminal charges and are found guilty even 
when none of their human agents is found guilty.207 Indeed, a Department of Justice 
memorandum issued by Eric Holder provides detailed advice for U.S. attorneys about 
bringing criminal charges against corporations themselves.208 The memorandum 
observes that corporations are “legal persons” capable of committing crimes; it 
emphasizes that corporate entities “should not be treated leniently” because they are 
not natural persons.209 Noting the similarity between the potential wrongdoing of 
corporations and natural persons, the memorandum goes on to state that “prosecutors 
should apply the same factors in determining whether to charge a corporation as they 
do with respect to individuals.”210 Importantly, this Department of Justice 
memorandum is not advancing a novel or radical legal argument. As I discussed 
earlier in the context of real entity theory, courts have long accepted the positions 
advanced by the memo and found corporations guilty of criminal wrongdoing.211 
Given how the legal system treats corporations in criminal contexts, the process 
of abduction gives us good reason for believing that corporations are intentional 
agents. It is true that our attributions of intentionality could be nothing more than 
“false” linguistic shortcuts. However, the explanatory power derived from viewing 
our ascriptions as nonmetaphorical provides substantial evidence for us to take 
seriously the claim that corporations are intentional agents. In the next subpart, I 
consider, and ultimately reject, an extreme form of this claim—namely, that 
corporations are a case of ontological emergence. 
B. Ontological Emergence 
Emergentist theories have traditionally been invoked to support the real entity 
theory of corporate personhood. These theories hold that superordinate entities 
spring forth from more fundamental properties but are not reducible to these 
properties. John Stuart Mill spoke of emergentism as follows: 
All organised bodies are composed of parts similar to those composing 
inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an 
inorganic state; but the phenomena of life which result from the 
juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner bear no analogy to any 
of the effects which would be produced by the action of the component 
substances considered as mere physical agents. To whatever degree we 
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might imagine our knowledge of the properties of the several 
ingredients of a living body to be extended and perfected, it is certain 
that no mere summing up of the separate actions of those elements will 
ever amount to the action of the living body itself.212 
In this passage, Mill has highlighted two basic emergentist principles. First, 
higher-order properties supervene upon lower-order properties, and second, 
knowledge of lower-order properties does not provide knowledge of higher-order 
properties. In other words, every lower-order arrangement of elements is associated 
with a specific higher-order output. However, simply knowing the lower-order 
arrangement does not permit one to derive the higher-order outputs unless the 
higher-order output has previously been observed. 
More specifically, emergentists hold that the world can be divided into distinct 
levels of complexity, generally corresponding to the focus of the scientific 
disciplines. Physics serves as the foundational level, and chemistry, biology, 
psychology, and sociology each occupy increasingly complex levels. Emergentists 
hold that knowledge of lower-level properties, such as physics, does not allow one to 
predict the higher-level properties, such as psychology. Even someone who knew 
everything regarding the lower-level properties would be incapable of predicting the 
higher-level properties that a specific lower-level structure would cause.213 In other 
words, emergent properties are features of complex systems that no one, no matter 
how well informed, can know from the position of a preemergent state. 
The early emergentists were primarily concerned with the emergence of life 
through a type of vis vitalis or the emergence of the human mind through a res 
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. . . . 
There is nothing, so far as I can see, mysterious or unscientific about a 
trans-ordinal law or about the notion of ultimate characteristics of a given 
order. A trans-ordinal law is as good a law as any other; and, once it has been 
discovered, it can be used like any other to suggest experiments, to make 
predictions, and to give us practical control over external objects. The only 
peculiarity of it is that we must wait till we meet with an actual instance of an 
object of the higher order before we can discover such a law; and that we 
cannot possibly deduce it beforehand from any combination of laws which we 
have discovered by observing aggregates of a lower order. 
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cogitans, but in the latter half of the nineteenth century, emergentism became 
popular as a way of analyzing groups. Otto von Gierke and Frederic Maitland are 
two of the most notable thinkers who advanced the position that group agents are 
emergent entities.214 According to them, a collective consciousness springs forth 
from the associations of individuals within corporations.215 Although this collective 
consciousness is caused by the interactions of individual members, it cannot be 
predicted purely by observing their actions.216 In other words, complete knowledge 
of individual actors within the group is not sufficient to give one knowledge of 
what actions the group itself will take. Despite knowing the intentional states of all 
the individuals within a corporation and how those individuals will interact with 
each other, one still cannot predict the corporation’s intentional states.217 Although 
the corporation’s intentionality requires the existence of lower-order properties (in 
this case the actions of individuals), its intentionality is not deducible from 
knowledge of these lower-order properties.218 Emergentists hold that some type of 
mysterious power, not unlike the vis vitalis or res cogitans, imbues a corporation 
with a life force of its own.219 As one legal scholar suggested, to deny this is to 
deny an “objective fact.”220 
However, this conception of corporations is ultimately unsatisfying because it posits 
the existence of a scientifically unexplainable and unverifiable force. For the same 
reasons that mainstream biologists have thoroughly rejected vitalism (the existence of a 
vis vitalis)221 and mainstream philosophers have thoroughly rejected Cartesian dualism 
                                                                                                                 
 
 214. See DAVID RUNCIMAN, PLURALISM AND THE PERSONALITY OF THE STATE 34–63, 89–
123 (1997). 
 215. See George Heiman, The Nature of Associations and Fellowships, in OTTO GIERKE, 
ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW: THE CLASSICAL AND EARLY CHRISTIAN STAGES 3, 7 (George 
Heiman ed. & trans., 1977) (“The association, or group, is a living entity . . . . Every group 
has a real and independent communal life, a conscious will, and an ability to act that are 
distinct from the lives and wills of its individual members.”). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See Brown, supra note 89, at 379 (treating corporations as organic entities that are 
greater than the sum of their parts). 
 218. See Machen, supra note 90, at 258–62. 
 219. Victor Morawetz writes of the naturalness and inevitability of conceiving of 
corporations and many other associations as distinct entities in this manner: 
The conception of a number of individuals as a corporate or collective entity 
occurs in the earliest stages of human development, and is essential to many of 
the most ordinary processes of thought. Thus, the existence of tribes, village 
communities, families, clans, and nations implies a conception of these several 
bodies of individuals as entities having corporate rights and attributes. An 
ordinary copartnership or firm is constantly treated as a united or corporate 
body in the actual transaction of business, though it is not recognized in that 
light in the procedure of the courts of law. So, in numberless other instances, 
associations which are not legally incorporated are considered as personified 
entities, acting as a unit and in one name; for example, political parties, 
societies, committees, courts. 
1 MORAWETZ, supra note 72, § 1, at 2–3. 
 220. See Machen, supra note 90, at 260. 
 221. ERNST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION, AND 
2015] DO CORPORATIONS HAVE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS? 81 
 
(the existence of a res cogitans),222 so, too, should legal theorists reject the idea that a 
ghostly entity emerges when individuals join together to form a corporation. 
Nonetheless, it should be clear that the actions and intentions of a corporation’s 
members have some bearing on the actions and intentions of the corporation itself. 
For this reason, we should look to more moderate theories. Ultimately, the theories 
discussed in the following subparts show that one can still accept the claim that 
corporations are intentional agents without needing to rely upon the ghostly 
emergence of a supernatural mind to support this position. 
C. Summative Accounts 
First, I argued that ascriptions of intentional states to corporations are not merely 
metaphors. They do mean that the corporate entity possesses an intentional state. 
Next, I argued against the possibility that the corporation itself has an independent 
mind that emerges from an aggregation of individuals. This leaves only the 
possibility that corporations are intentional agents whose intentionality is derived 
from the actions of their members. 
In the next two subparts, I explore two major variants of this type of joint 
intentionality. I first look at summative accounts. These theories maintain that 
groups believe whatever a majority of their members believes. As anyone who has 
interacted with corporations knows, they are not democracies. Employees do not 
vote to determine what actions a corporation should take or what beliefs it should 
possess. More than this, certain decision-making procedures exist such that the 
corporation’s intentional states do not mirror the intentional states of any subset of 
its members. With this in mind, I quickly reject summative accounts as being 
unrepresentative of how corporations function. In the following subpart, I turn to 
nonsummative accounts. These are theories that allow for group beliefs to differ 
from the beliefs of their individual members. Nonsummative accounts can be 
broken down into individualistic and group-centered approaches. Ultimately, I 
argue that the group-centered approaches best explain how corporations function. 
In the following excerpt, the philosopher Anthony Quinton introduces the term 
“summative”: 
In some cases, which may be called summative, statements about social 
objects are equivalent to statements otherwise the same that refer 
explicitly, if at some level of generality, to individual people. To say 
that the French middle class is thrifty is to say that most French middle 
class people are.223 
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Quinton goes on to formulate what Margaret Gilbert calls the “simple 
summative account”224: 
We do, of course, speak freely of the mental properties and acts of a 
group in the way we do of individual people. Groups are said to have 
beliefs, emotions and attitudes and to take decisions and make 
promises. But these ways of speaking are plainly metaphorical. To 
ascribe mental predicates to a group is always an indirect way of 
ascribing such predicates to its members. With such mental states as 
beliefs and attitudes the ascriptions are of what I have called a 
summative kind. To say that the industrial working class is determined 
to resist anti-trade-union laws is to say that all or most industrial 
workers are so minded.225 
According to the simple summative account, Group G believes that p if and only 
if all or most of the members believe that p. To see why the simple summative 
account fails to adequately describe group beliefs, consider the following example. 
Suppose that the Supreme Court has just issued a ruling on X.226 All of the Justices 
agree that the doctrine should eventually be applied to scenario Y; however, 
because that situation is too far removed from the current controversy, none of the 
Justices raises the issue. They do not even discuss scenario Y with each other. In 
this context, it would be very strange to say that the Supreme Court believes that 
the doctrine should apply in case Y. Nevertheless, the simple summative account 
would hold that the Supreme Court does, in fact, believe that the doctrine should be 
extended to scenario Y. This critique argues that the mere existence of a certain 
intentional state in a majority of group members is insufficient for one to ascribe 
that state to the group as a whole. 
To avoid this problem, some philosophers have proposed the complex 
summative account. It states that 
Group G believes that p if and only if (1) most of the members of G 
believe that p and (2) it is common knowledge in G that (1).227 
Unfortunately, this reformulation leaves us little better off. If we change the 
previous example by stipulating that the Justices discussed their preferences and are 
aware that each of them believes the doctrine should extend to case Y, does that 
affect our ability to attribute belief to the Supreme Court? The answer seems to be 
no. Only if the Justices issue a majority opinion containing this belief should we 
ascribe the belief to the Supreme Court. Because of this intuition, we should be 
suspect of any account of group intentionality that endorses a contrary outcome.228 
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The critiques I have offered so far show why the criteria advanced by 
summative accounts are too weak to provide a model for understanding corporate 
intentionality. In another sense, however, the summative models are too strong. 
This is because these models would require a majority of a corporation’s members 
to hold a belief in order for us to attribute that belief to the corporation.229 As 
anyone familiar with corporate decision making knows, majoritarian decision 
making is not the rule. Corporations frequently possess intentional states with 
which a majority of their members disagrees. Indeed, corporations can even possess 
states that none of their members hold.230 
The philosopher John Searle offers another compelling critique of the theory 
that group intentions are nothing more than the summation of individual 
intentions.231 Picture a group of people having a picnic on the beach under the 
warm sun. Suddenly it grows dark and rain clouds move in. Everyone gets up, 
grabs their belongings, and dashes towards shelter. Each individual independently 
holds the intention, “I am running to shelter.” Now, instead, imagine that the people 
are actors in a play. They undertake the exact same actions as our other group of 
beachgoers. However, according to Searle, the actors have the joint intention, “We 
are running to shelter.” This intention is distinct from the intentions held by the 
random assortment of beachgoers. Searle emphasizes that there is a difference 
between “we intend to J” and “I intend to J” and that the former does not result 
from summing up instances of the latter. Similarly, we cannot identify a 
corporation’s beliefs simply by summing up the beliefs of the individual 
employees. Due to these deficiencies in the summative accounts of joint 
intentionality, we must look elsewhere for an account of corporate intentionality. 
The nonsummative accounts discussed in the next subpart provide a better solution. 
D. Nonsummative Accounts 
Nonsummative accounts do not propose that group intentions come about 
simply by summing the intentions of individuals who constitute the group. Indeed, 
many theories do not even require a single individual to hold an intention in order 
for the group to hold it.232 If, as I show, this type of account best maps onto 
corporate activity, it should provide compelling evidence that corporations have 
intentional states of their own and, accordingly, should be treated as individuals in 
their own right. 
There are two main categories of nonsummative accounts: (1) those which hold 
a commitment to individualism, denying that joint intentions are the intentions of a 
group agent, and (2) those which maintain that joint intentions create a group agent 
to whom we can ascribe intentional action and other psychological attributes. I 
review each of these in turn and ultimately conclude that the latter theories better 
explain the actions of corporations. 
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1. Individualistic 
Two major proponents of individualistic accounts of joint intentionality are John 
Searle and Michael Bratman. Searle draws a distinction between I-intentions and 
we-intentions.233 However, he does so in an interesting manner. Searle’s theory is 
both nonsummative and atomistic (i.e., starts from the supposition that the 
individual should serve as the basic unit of analysis for social life).234 In an effort to 
maintain these two aspects, Searle argues that joint intentions exist in individual 
minds. Essentially, Searle claims that the individual belief “we intend to x” is 
sufficient to constitute joint intentionality.235 
Searle’s account has been criticized for its failure to incorporate the normative 
relations that seemingly pervade joint intentions.236 To see why, suppose that you 
and I are painting a house, and each of us forms the we-intention—“we intend to 
paint the house.” It seems clear that we have created obligations to each other. You 
have the right to expect that I will work to advance our we-intention; likewise, I 
have the right to expect that you will work to advance our we-intention. If either 
you or I fail to do our part, the other has the right to admonish the slacker. Because 
Searle’s view is solipsistic, it does not capture this element of collective intentions. 
Michael Bratman’s theory presents a slightly different version of joint 
intentionality.237 Although Bratman’s theory remains individualistic and 
nonsummative, it stresses the importance of interrelations between the individuals 
who form the joint intention. A slightly condensed version of Bratman’s account 
runs as follows: 
We intend to J if and only if: 
(1) I intend that we J; 
(2) You intend that we J; 
(3) I intend that we J in accordance with and because of meshing 
subplans of 1 and 2, and you intend the same; and 
(4) It is common knowledge between us that 1, 2, and 3.238 
If we map these criteria onto our house-painting endeavor, we would have a 
joint intention only if (1) I intend that we paint the house, (2) you intend that we 
paint the house, (3) I intend that we paint the house in accordance with and because 
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of meshing subplans of 1 and 2, and you intend the same, and (4) all three of these 
conditions are common knowledge between us. We would have meshing subplans 
so long as our goals do not directly conflict. Importantly, our goals need not be 
identical; they need only be nonconflicting. 
Suppose I want to paint the house white, and you are indifferent as to the color—
but you want to use semigloss paint, and I have no preference on that matter. Even 
though our intentions are not identical, our subplans mesh because they are 
compatible. We can use white, semigloss paint, and both of us will be satisfied with 
the result. If, however, I wanted to use satin paint and would not compromise, our 
subplans would not mesh, and we would be unable to form a joint intention. 
Despite an emphasis on interrelations between individuals, Bratman’s theory 
still falls prey to one critique levied at Searle’s account—namely, that it fails to 
consider the normativity of joint intentions. In addition, Bratman’s account has 
been attacked on the ground that individuals cannot have an intention “that we 
J.”239 The argument goes that only the subject responsible for deciding whether to 
undertake an action can form the intention to do such an action.240 In other words, I 
can have an intention that I paint the house, but unless I have control over your 
behavior, I cannot form an intention that we paint the house. My having an 
intention that we paint the house cannot ensure that we will, in fact, paint the 
house; therefore, it makes no sense to speak of me as having a we-intention. 
Ultimately, since I am not a “we,” I cannot have a we-intention. Only a group agent 
would be capable of having such an intention. The theories discussed in the 
following section avoid these critiques and show how group agents can solve our 
dilemma and provide insight into the workings of corporations. 
2. Plural Subject 
In her work, Margaret Gilbert describes collective belief as a “plural subject 
concept.”241 This is “the idea that a plurality of persons may in certain special 
contexts be seen as constituting the subject (as opposed to the subjects) of a certain 
psychological attribute.”242 The group should be thought of as an entity above and 
beyond its constituent parts. Gilbert writes that “A and B form a plural subject of 
believing that p if and only if A and B are jointly committed to believing that p as a 
body.”243 Joint commitment requires willingness, “at least in relation to certain 
conditions, to put one’s own will into a ‘pool of wills’ dedicated, as one, to a single 
goal (or whatever it is that the pool is dedicated to).”244 
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Margaret Gilbert gives an example of a plural subject in a basic form that she 
calls the “simple interpersonal.”245 George and Mary are two parents who have to 
decide how late their son Johnnie can stay out. Whereas George believes that 
Johnnie should be able to stay out until 2:00 a.m., Mary thinks the boy should be 
home by 10:00 p.m. After a long discussion, Mary proposes that they should tell 
Johnnie to be home by midnight. Even though he does not believe midnight is the 
best time, George agrees to this compromise and tells Johnnie, “We think you 
should be home by midnight.” Neither George nor Mary holds this belief, yet the 
plural subject “we” does. George and Mary are jointly committed to believe as a 
body that Johnnie should be home by midnight, and their joint commitment informs 
their dealings with Johnnie. If George tells Johnnie that he can stay out until two, 
Mary would have a right to rebuke George for failing to uphold his obligation in his 
dealings with Johnnie. However, if George said to Mary later that night, “I still 
don’t see why Johnnie can’t stay out until two,” Mary would not have the same 
right to rebuke George. The obligations that extend from the beliefs of the plural 
subject are context sensitive. 
This example illustrates two core features of Gilbert’s theory: (1) If A and B 
“form a plural subject of believing that p, each of them is obligated to the other to 
do her part in believing that p as a body”;246 and (2) A and B “have a basis for 
rebuking one another should the appropriate behavior not occur.”247 
Gilbert’s theory goes far in explaining the obligations of corporate employees. 
By agreeing to work for a company, the employees form a joint commitment to put 
their individual wills into a pool of wills dedicated to advancing the interests of the 
corporation. Doing one’s part in believing that p as a body entails accepting the 
corporation’s judgments as one’s own in matters relating to the company. If an 
employee fails to do his part in adopting the company’s positions, he can be subject 
to legitimate rebuke by other members of the group. A rebuke could be as 
inconsequential as an admonishment from fellow coworkers or as significant as 
being fired by a supervisor. Although Gilbert’s account takes us in the right 
direction, it does not completely explain corporate intentionality. 
For a fuller account, we need to incorporate aspects of Raimo Tuomela’s theory 
of joint intentionality, which he calls the positional account of group beliefs.248 
Tuomela writes that “[p]ositional beliefs are views that a position-holder has qua a 
position-holder or has internalized and accepted as a basis of his performances of 
aforementioned kinds of social tasks.”249 In other words, group beliefs are not 
derived from what individual members of the group actually believe; they are 
derived from what individual members of the group accept as true given their 
obligations to the group entity. For example, each member of the board of directors 
of an oil company may individually believe that drilling in Alaska is bad because it 
destroys a beautiful natural habitat and endangers many interesting and important 
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species. At the same time, each of these board members may positionally accept 
that the oil company should continue to support drilling in Alaska. According to 
Tuomela’s account, it would be appropriate to say that the company has the belief 
that it should drill in Alaska. 
Tuomela also draws a distinction between operative and nonoperative members. 
The operative members are those decision makers who influence the firm’s 
intentional states.250 These are generally high-level managers and directors who 
form desires and define goals that the corporation will act to achieve. Nonoperative 
members are those who merely take action to fulfill the corporation’s goals. They 
do not have decision-making authority.251 
As one can see, Tuomela’s theory relies upon a distinction both between 
individual belief and acceptance and between operative and nonoperative members. 
This distinction between individual belief and acceptance is vital to understanding 
how corporations can act in ways that are independent of their members. When 
board members or executives make decisions, they are not reporting what they 
personally believe to be true; they are reporting what they positionally accept as 
true given their position within the corporation. 
The fact that the intentional states of corporations and the intentional states of 
their members can diverge in such a manner allows Tuomela to explain how firms 
can possess intentionality. Specifically, he writes that “a group intentionally 
performs an action X if the relevant operative members, acting in the right way in 
their positions and carrying out the group intention that the authority system of the 
group has produced . . . jointly perform an action Y which brings about X.”252 
In the next Part, I build upon Tuomela’s theory to defend the position that 
corporations satisfy Hobbes’s performative conception of personhood. Specifically, I 
use Tuomela’s understanding of positional beliefs and operative members to augment 
a judgment-aggregation dilemma developed by Christian List and Philip Pettit. 
IV. CORPORATIONS AS PERFORMATIVE PERSONS 
In this Part, I build upon the previously discussed theories of joint intentionality to 
argue that corporations meet the performative conception of personhood. In 
particular, I rely upon work by the philosophers Christian List and Philip Pettit, who 
argue that the performative core of personhood is (1) mutual awareness and (2) 
rational unity.253 Aggregations of people that display these two features should be 
conceived of as persons in their own right.254 In this Part, I will argue that, because 
corporations fulfill both conditions, they meet the qualifications for personhood. It is 
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important to note that their personhood is not ghostly in nature. Instead, it comes 
about due to the decision-making procedures employed by corporations. 
Mutual awareness, the first condition, occurs through the formation of unified 
intentions.255 To see why this requirement is necessary, envision a natural person 
(let’s call him Dave) whose intentional states are entirely in conflict. Dave wants to 
have dinner and wants to not have dinner. He fears clowns and does not fear 
clowns. He likes cats and does not like cats. I want to emphasize that these are not 
superficial conflicts. We have all been in situations where our preferences and 
desires are pulled in opposite directions. It is not the case that Dave wants to have 
dinner because he is hungry and does not want to have dinner because it is only 
4:00 p.m. Rather, it is the case that he wants to have dinner simpliciter and 
simultaneously does not want to have dinner simpliciter. In other words, I mean 
that Dave’s thoughts are contradictory all the way down. In fact, such mental 
paralysis leaves him unable to function in any sort of coherent or rational manner. 
At this point, we would likely start to doubt whether Dave should qualify as a 
“person” in our community. Certainly, he would still be a human and therefore 
deserving of human rights; however, given Dave’s severe irrationality, it is unclear 
whether he would deserve constitutional protections such as First Amendment free 
speech or free exercise rights. At the very least, we would certainly want to deny 
Dave rights under the Second Amendment.256 
In a corporate context, mutual awareness can be met when the individuals within 
the system have a shared purpose and form intentions consistent with advancing 
that purpose. The joint-intentionality literature reviewed in the last Part illustrates 
how corporations fulfill this requirement. Indeed, all of the theories of joint 
intentionality have, as their foundation, the existence of some sort of shared 
understanding or common purpose. They also require actors within the group to 
form intentions consistent with advancing that common purpose. Recall Bratman’s 
discussion on painting the house.257 If we both have the intent to paint the house, 
but you want to paint the house blue and I want to paint the house red, then we do 
not have any sort of collective mental state. Our goals are incompatible. 
Collectively, we are the same as Dave. Our conflicting intentional states leave us 
incapable of meeting the mutual awareness condition. However, if we adjust our 
intentions (let’s say I change my mind and now want to paint the house blue), we 
can form a collective agent. 
Margaret Gilbert’s conception of joint commitment258 is particularly analogous 
to mutual awareness. Just as Johnnie’s parents formed a joint commitment to set his 
curfew to midnight, individuals within a corporation form joint commitments to 
advance the shared goals of the corporation. Whenever an employee performs his 
job, he is lending stability to the intentional states of the corporation and helping 
fulfill the requirements for mutual awareness. 
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The first condition seems satisfied. But what about rational unity, the second 
condition? List and Pettit argue that any system that (1) has intentional attitudes, (2) 
updates its intentional attitudes as new information is introduced, and (3) qualifies as 
a subject of legitimate rebuke meets the burden of rational unity. While explaining 
this concept in a related paper, Pettit writes that “a system will count as an intentional 
subject only if it preserves intentional attitudes over time and forms, unforms, and 
acts on those attitudes . . . in a rationally permissible manner.”259 For example, “If the 
system believes that p and comes across evidence that not-p, it must tend to unform 
that belief. If the system believes that p and learns that if p then q, it must come to 
form the belief that q or to unform one of the other beliefs.”260 
Decision structures lead corporations to fulfill the rational-unity requirement. As 
should be apparent to corporate observers, companies strive to act in rational ways. 
If the goal is for the corporation to maximize profits and it can do so by producing 
widgets, the company will produce widgets. If the market for widgets declines 
against expectations and producing widgets can no longer be profitable, the 
corporation will take this new information into account. Consistent with this 
change of circumstances, the business will stop producing widgets. This is just one 
basic example of how corporations fulfill the condition of rational unity. 
Corporations constantly update their intentional states and develop new beliefs 
regarding how best to fulfill their goals. This process qualifies as rational unity: 
first, the corporation starts with a set of beliefs; second, the corporation receives 
new information from the world around it; finally, the corporation updates its 
beliefs to reflect the newly acquired information. 
A general look at corporate action will show that, in nearly all cases, corporations 
attempt to maintain consistent preferences and update their beliefs as new information 
is acquired. Just as an individual who acts irrationally will almost certainly fail to 
maximize his utility, a corporation that lacks rational unity will quickly be forced into 
bankruptcy. Indeed, a corporation that fails to uphold rational unity will soon find 
itself the target of rebuke. As mentioned above, this potential for leveling criticism at 
the entity itself is a necessary condition of rational unity. Pettit clarifies this concept, 
writing that systems “must be such that they can be held responsible for failures to 
unify their intentional states and actions in a rational way.”261 
It is important to note that the corporation’s rational unity is not equivalent to 
the rational unity of any set of its members. Insights into judgment aggregation 
illustrate why the intentional states of corporations can be discontinuous from the 
intentional states of their constituent members. In 1986, Lewis Kornhauser and 
Lawrence Sager first identified a vote-aggregation problem in the judiciary that 
they called the “doctrinal paradox.”262 Kornhauser and Sager found that, in 
multijudge panels, the disposition of a case can vary depending on whether the 
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judges vote on the issues or the outcome. The paradigmatic example of the 
doctrinal paradox involves three decision makers who must form judgments on two 
premises and a conclusion. The following setup presents this example and involves 
three judges who must vote on the following three issues: 
 
  The defendant had a contractual obligation to undertake a specific 
action (the first premise). 
  The defendant failed to perform that action (the second premise). 
  The defendant is liable for breach of contract (the conclusion). 
Table 2. The doctrinal paradox 
 Contract? Breach? Liability? 
Judge A No Yes No 
Judge B Yes No No 
Judge C Yes Yes Yes 
Majority Yes Yes No 
Judge A believes the second premise but not the first; this leads him to also reject 
the conclusion. Believing that the first premise is true but that the second is not, Judge 
B rejects the conclusion. Finally, Judge C believes both premises and therefore 
accepts the conclusion. This vote breakdown yields majority support for each premise 
but not for the conclusion. More specifically, the judges collectively believe the 
following: (1) the defendant had a contractual obligation to undertake a specific 
action, (2) the defendant failed to perform that action, and (3) the defendant is not 
liable for breach of contract. This set of beliefs is inconsistent. If both premises are 
true, the conclusion must also be true. Under this voting breakdown, the outcome of 
the case differs whether the court holds a vote on the premises or on the conclusion. If 
the judges vote on the elements, the defendant will be found liable, but if they vote on 
the legal outcome, the defendant will be found not liable. 
Despite the doctrinal paradox’s emphasis on the judiciary, it has implications for 
corporate decision making. Identifying this application, Christian List and Philip 
Pettit developed a generalized version of the doctrinal paradox known as the 
discursive dilemma.263 Their reformulation supports the existence of corporate 
intentionality.264 The following example shows just how the occurrence of the 
discursive dilemma can cause corporations to adopt religious beliefs independent of 
the beliefs of their members. 
Suppose that a corporation has to decide whether to seek an exemption from the 
contraception mandate. The corporation tasks three of its members (Executives A, 
B, and C) with resolving this issue. Amongst themselves, the executives decide that 
the corporation should only seek an exemption if two conditions are met: (1) the 
corporation’s business practices should adhere to the tenets of Christianity, and (2) 
abiding by the contraception mandate would violate Christian tenets. 
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For the time being, let us suppose that the personal beliefs and positionally 
accepted judgments of the three executives are the same. The executives vote in the 
following manner: Executive A does not believe that the corporation should always 
adhere to the tenets of Christianity but does think that the contraception mandate is 
incompatible with Christian principles. Accordingly, she votes against seeking an 
exemption. Executive B believes that the corporation should always work to uphold 
the tenets of Christianity but does not think the mandate violates those tenets. He, 
too, votes against seeking an exemption. Finally, Executive C believes both that the 
corporation should be run according to Christian principles and that abiding by the 
mandate is incompatible with following such principles. He votes “yes” to both 
premises and the conclusion. This vote pattern is reproduced in Table 3. 
Table 3. The discursive dilemma 
 Follow Christian 
principles? 
Mandate violates 
principles? 
Seek 
exemption? 
Executive A No Yes No 
Executive B Yes No No 
Executive C Yes Yes Yes 
Majority Yes Yes No 
As in the judicial example, the majority votes on the premises do not agree with 
the majority vote on the conclusion. In this scenario, a majority of executives 
believe that the company should follow Christian principles, and a majority also 
believes that the contraception mandate is incompatible with such principles. 
Despite these beliefs, a majority concludes that the corporation should not seek an 
exemption. However, by adopting a premise-based voting system, the corporation 
comes to believe that it should seek an exemption. Importantly, the reasons for 
believing that an exemption should be sought are the corporation’s own, and not 
the reasons of any member of the corporation. The corporation is an intentional 
agent that speaks with its own voice and represents its own views. It is a single 
person, constituted by—but separate from—its individual members. 
One might object that this representation of corporate decision making is 
unrealistic. Executives would never sit in a room, vote on premises, find that the 
premises lead to an undesirable conclusion, and say, “There’s nothing we can do. 
Our hands are bound by the premise-based voting system. We must adopt a terrible 
conclusion.” I fully agree with that assessment and have presented this example 
primarily to serve as a simple, if somewhat stylized, explanation of the discursive 
dilemma. Next, I will slightly modify the example. The change adds a bit of 
complexity but shows how the discursive dilemma realistically occurs every day in 
corporations that have even a minimal level of decentralized decision making. 
Suppose that the same two premises still need to be decided. However, this time 
there are two groups of decision makers. Committee 1 comprises three people 
(Members A, B, and C) who must decide whether the corporation should abide by 
the tenets of Christianity. If they vote “yes” to follow the tenets, Committee 2 
(Members D, E, and F) must decide whether following the mandate would conflict 
with Christian tenets. In short, Committee 1 decides one question; Committee 2 
decides another, and together their responses determine whether the corporation 
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will seek an exemption from the mandate. Let us stipulate that the committee 
members do not know what conclusions their premises will be used for; therefore, 
we do not have to worry about them voting insincerely to ensure that their preferred 
outcome occurs. 
Table 4 shows the vote preferences of the members of both committees. The 
words enclosed in parentheses indicate the individuals’ preferences on the issues for 
which they did not vote. The words that are not enclosed in parentheses indicate the 
members’ preferences on the issues for which they voted (i.e., Members A, B, and C 
voted on the first premise, and Members D, E, and F voted on the second premise). 
Table 4. A two-committee problem 
 Follow Christian 
principles? 
Mandate violates 
principles? 
Seek 
exemption? 
Member A No (No) (No) 
Member B Yes (No) (No) 
Member C Yes (No) (No) 
Member D (No) Yes (No) 
Member E (No) No (No) 
Member F (No) Yes (No) 
Majority No No No 
Decision Yes Yes Yes 
The interesting point to observe about this setup is that a clear majority of 
members prefers the “no” option on each of the premises, and every single member 
prefers a “no” conclusion. Nonetheless, since a majority of each committee votes 
“yes” on its committee-specific premise, the conclusion receives a “yes” vote. This 
means that the corporation will perform an action that not a single one of the 
decision makers wanted it to do. However, to preserve rationality at the group 
level, the corporation is committed to acting in this manner.265 When a corporation 
undertakes actions of this sort, it evinces an intentionality distinct from any of its 
members. This is precisely why it is appropriate to say that corporations are 
intentional subjects. 
The discursive dilemma shows how the corporation can adopt positions distinct 
from the positions of its members when there are multiple premises that entail a 
specific conclusion. That said, one might argue that the solution is simply to have 
corporate decision makers vote on the conclusions themselves rather than on the 
premises. In each of the preceding examples, if the employees had voted on the 
conclusion, the majority belief would have been adopted, and we would have 
avoided the unsettling result in which the corporation adopts and acts on beliefs 
with which every one of its members disagrees. If the problem is that group-level 
intent fails to track individual-level intent, corporations should just change their 
voting protocols so that employees decide conclusions rather than premises. 
This change, unfortunately, would not eliminate the corporation’s claim to being 
an intentional subject. As Tuomela’s account showed, corporate decision makers 
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do not vote their own personal beliefs; they express their positionally accepted 
beliefs.266 Like List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, Tuomela’s analysis allows for 
corporations to be intentional subjects, but his account also permits corporations to 
take on intentional states that are independent of their members when only one 
decision must be made. 
Consider the following example. Again, three executives must make a decision. 
This time, they only have to decide the conclusion, namely, whether the 
corporation should seek an exemption from the mandate. In this scenario, the 
corporation has included a phrase in its charter noting its “strong Catholic 
commitments.” Further, the Catholic Church has stated that good Catholics will not 
abide by the contraception mandate. Being atheists themselves, all three executives 
personally believe that “all things considered, the corporation should not seek an 
exemption from the mandate” (proposition “not p”). However, all three also 
positionally accept that “all things considered, the corporation should seek an 
exemption from the mandate” (proposition “p”). This tension leads to the situation 
summarized in Table 5 in which every decision maker believes not p and every 
decision maker positionally accepts p. 
Table 5. Seek exemption from mandate? 
 Personally believe? Positionally accept? 
Executive A No Yes 
Executive B No Yes 
Executive C No Yes 
Majority No Yes 
As individuals, the executives believe that the corporation should not violate the 
mandate, but as group members, the executives believe that the corporation should 
violate the mandate. Because the corporation will adopt the latter position—one 
with which no executive actually agrees—it is again reasonable to conceive of the 
corporation as having an independent intentional state. Each of the examples 
provides strong support for the claim that corporations are persons. Because 
corporations hold intentional states and update their intentional states in a rational 
manner, they have the ability to function as persons in a fundamental way. Indeed, 
they meet Hobbes’s performative conception of personhood. 
V. CORPORATE SINCERITY 
In free exercises cases, plaintiffs must show that the challenged law “(1) 
substantially burden[s] (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise.”267 In this Part, I focus on 
the second prong and argue that this sincerity requirement should assuage the 
concerns of those who object that corporations will exploit free exercise protections 
for pecuniary gain.268 Importantly, I do not deny that corporations may attempt to 
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take advantage of this constitutional right; however, there is strong reason to doubt 
they will succeed. The many cases withholding free exercise protections from human 
claimants who did not have sincere religious beliefs lead me to believe that courts can 
deftly separate the insincere corporate claimants from the sincere ones.269 
For instance, on the basis of insincere religious beliefs, people have attempted to 
assert the Free Exercise Clause to acquire special prison privileges,270 defame 
others,271 have sex with young girls,272 and circumvent drug laws,273 among others. 
In each case, the courts have intervened to prevent the claimants from obtaining 
cover under the umbrella of the Free Exercise Clause. Judges have routinely 
grappled with insincere religious claims, and there is no reason why that line of 
cases cannot serve as a guide for prohibiting disingenuous corporate free exercise 
claims. In the remainder of this Article, I try to offer up such a guide. 
First off, there is ample precedent supporting the constitutionality of a religious 
sincerity requirement. The seminal case on the matter is United States v. Ballard.274 
In this action, the government brought religious fraud charges against three leaders 
of the “I Am” movement: Guy, Edna, and Douglas Ballard. Guy had presented 
himself as the divine messenger of St. Germain, claimed to have spoken with Jesus, 
and told his followers that he had acquired supernatural powers. Edna and Douglas 
similarly claimed to have supernatural powers that enabled them to cure diseases 
and illnesses.275 The government alleged that Guy, Edna, and Douglas made these 
representations with the intent to defraud. 
At trial, the judge instructed the jury to only examine the sincerity of the 
Ballards’ beliefs and to disregard the verity of the actual claims. In other words, if 
the jurors determined that the Ballards sincerely believed their representations, the 
jurors had to find them not guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s 
instruction not to examine the truth or falsity of the claims, writing: 
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if 
not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to 
trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the 
same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers 
of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The First 
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Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of religion 
for preferred treatment. It puts them all in that position.276 
Interestingly, despite being viewed as the foundation of sincerity testing, the 
Ballard decision did not specifically reach that issue. Instead, the Court simply 
remanded the question back to the Ninth Circuit. Nonetheless, district courts, courts 
of appeals, and even the Supreme Court itself have subsequently cited Ballard as 
precedent for the sincerity test277 and consistently reaffirmed the proposition that 
insincere beliefs are unworthy of constitutional protection.278 
An obvious objection at this stage is that, even if sincerity testing is 
constitutional, it is impossible to determine whether corporations are sincere. The 
same criticism, however, can be directed at sincerity testing for natural persons. It 
is impossible for courts to look into the brain of a human and know whether that 
person’s beliefs are sincerely held.279 Indeed, there is a strong argument that we can 
better peer into the mind of a corporation than into the mind of a natural person. 
After all, we can view the decision-making procedures employed by a corporation 
and the interactions of its managers and board of directors. We can see the 
corporate intentional states emerge. The same is impossible to do with respect to 
natural persons. Whereas the corporate mind is potentially observable, the human 
mind is sealed off from the judiciary. 
Because of this inability to pry into the mind of natural persons, judges have used 
other proxies to determine sincerity, such as whether (1) the claimant has taken 
actions inconsistent with the professed belief, (2) there are adverse consequences of 
holding the belief or the belief has an alternative secular motivation, (3) the belief is 
similar in nature to traditional religious beliefs, or (4) the claimant demonstrates a 
lack of devotion to his faith.280 Importantly, every single one of these factors can be 
used to evaluate corporate sincerity. Let us go through each consideration, in turn, to 
see how courts have found evidence of insincerity. 
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First, courts have long found that taking actions inconsistent with the professed 
belief is evidence of religious insincerity. For instance, in a case involving religious 
fraud, the Ninth Circuit admitted evidence showing that the defendant was “an 
habitual indulger in each and every of the sins and practices he pretended to 
condemn.”281 Ultimately, the court found the defendant guilty of claiming to possess 
supernatural powers for the purpose of obtaining money from others.282 In another 
case, the Second Circuit wrote that “an adherent’s belief would not be ‘sincere’ if he 
acts in a manner inconsistent with that belief.”283 This principle is exemplified in 
Dobkins v. District of Columbia.284 Here, a member of the Jewish faith objected to 
continuing his trial past sundown on Friday—the start of the Jewish Sabbath. After 
learning that the claimant worked at his office on Saturdays, the court concluded that 
there was no religious basis for moving the trial to a different date.285 
However, not every inconsistent action should be construed as evidence of 
insincerity. Because of the importance of upholding legitimate constitutional claims, 
courts have sometimes erred on the side of caution and held that minor deviations 
from the belief are not sufficient for a finding of insincerity. For example, in Lovelace 
v. Lee, the Fourth Circuit found that the sincerity of a prisoner’s beliefs should not be 
doubted when the prisoner had violated a religious fast once.286 Just as they do when 
evaluating the beliefs of natural persons, courts can compare a corporation’s actions 
with its professed beliefs to find evidence of insincerity. The greater the divergence 
between belief and action, the more likely the corporation is to be insincere. We 
could envision a scenario in which an advertising corporation has done work 
promoting Planned Parenthood but now expresses a religious objection to the 
contraception mandate. In this case, the inconsistent action would severely undermine 
the corporation’s claim for a religious exemption. 
A second way to gauge sincerity involves looking at the consequences that flow 
from—and the motivations behind—holding the belief in question.287 Justices 
Black and Douglas pointed to the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ “willingness to suffer 
persecution and punishment, rather than make the pledge [of allegiance]” as 
evidence of “[t]he devoutness of their belief.”288 Conversely, if the claimant’s 
belief appears to be motivated by a secular purpose, it is less likely to be held 
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sincerely.289 At times, the claimant will specifically admit the existence of a secular 
motivation, such as monetary gain;290 however, the evidence will normally be more 
indirect. For instance, in United States v. Kuch, the court found the claimants’ lack 
“of a belief in a supreme being, a religious discipline, a ritual, or tenets to guide 
one’s daily existence” demonstrated “that the desire to use drugs and to enjoy drugs 
for their own sake, regardless of religious experience, is the coagulant of this 
organization and the reason for its existence.”291 In the corporate context, internal 
communications will provide insight into the factors motivating the company’s free 
exercise claim. By reviewing e-mails, a court might find that a corporation wants 
an exemption from the mandate, not for religious reasons, but because it will 
reduce health insurance costs. 
Next, corporations, like people, should not be able to claim religious exemption 
for beliefs that are so far removed from traditional notions of religion as to be 
absurd. Although this is a necessary limitation to prevent abuse, it is important that 
this examination not consider the verity of the claimant’s beliefs.292 As Chief 
Justice Burger wrote, “One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so 
clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free 
Exercise Clause . . . .”293 
Fortunately, we do not have to spend too much time imagining, as there are 
actual cases that present patently absurd beliefs. One example is Brown v. Pena.294 
In that case, the court determined that a plaintiff who claimed his religion required 
him to eat cat food could not possibly have been sincere.295 In another case, the 
claimants professed to subscribe to a religion whose official songs were “Puff, the 
Magic Dragon” and “Row, Row, Row Your Boat”; whose motto was “Victory over 
Horseshit!”; and whose symbol was a three-eyed toad.296 These cases show that, if 
corporations dare to advance doctrines clearly nonreligious in nature, the courts 
will surely decline to grant them protection. 
Courts have also looked to the depth of a claimant’s devotion to his professed 
faith. This factor arose in the well-known case of Wisconsin v. Yoder.297 Here, the 
Supreme Court granted the Amish a religious exemption from a state law that 
required all children under the age of sixteen to attend school. In doing so, the 
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Court emphasized the deep religious “conviction” of the Amish.298 In Thomas v. 
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, the Court similarly 
highlighted a Jehovah’s Witness’s “honest conviction” that working at a weapons 
plant violated tenets of his religion.299 In that case, the Court required Indiana to 
provide the claimant with unemployment benefits because he had terminated his 
employment in accordance with a sincerely held religious belief.300 Corporations’ 
religious beliefs can also vary in their intensity, and the courts would do well to 
ascertain how strong a putative belief really is. They can easily do so by examining 
the corporation’s historical religious commitments. Has the corporation always 
operated according to the religious belief it seeks to claim protection under? Or is it 
a newfound belief that was conveniently adopted just as a new law that conflicts 
with the belief came into effect? 
Although all of the preceding cases involve human claimants, there is no reason 
the same analyses cannot be applied to corporate persons. The fear that corporations 
will abuse free exercise rights is overblown. As this summary has shown, courts have 
the tools to prevent corporations from exploiting the Free Exercise Clause. Just as the 
sincerity test has stopped natural persons from taking advantage of religious 
protections, so too can it stop corporate persons from doing the same. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has grappled with the issue of corporate personhood for 
more than two hundred years. Despite addressing the topic in dozens of cases, the 
Court has never adopted a coherent, consistent account of corporate personhood. I 
have attempted to provide one possible account. Drawing upon the dominant 
philosophical theories of mind and group agency, I have developed a 
metaphysically grounded account of the subject, one that acknowledges 
corporations as persons in their own right. 
In this Article, I have shown that corporations not only have a wide range of 
intentional states but also possess rational unity—a feature that is at the core of 
personhood. Using the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. case as an example,301 I 
have shown how this understanding of the corporation offers a third path that 
differs from both the majority and the dissent. Whereas the dissent endorsed an 
artificial entity theory of the firm and the majority endorsed an aggregate entity 
theory of the firm, I have advanced a real entity theory. Corporations have 
intentional states that differ widely from the intentional states of their members. 
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This finding removes the strongest argument from supporters of expansive 
corporate constitutional rights—namely, that corporations simply mirror the 
intentional states of their individual members. 
The stronger form of corporate personhood that I endorse in this Article actually 
argues in favor of narrower corporate constitutional rights. Because for-profit 
corporations are persons capable of possessing religious beliefs, I do concede that 
they should be eligible for protection under the Free Exercise Clause. However, I 
show that they will be unable to exercise this protection frequently. The inability of 
most, if not all, for-profit corporations to possess sincere religious beliefs imposes 
a strict limitation on corporate religious rights. 
The contraception mandate cases offered the Supreme Court another chance to 
revisit its corporate personhood doctrine. Unfortunately, the Justices did not seize 
this opportunity to develop a coherent theory. Although this narrow case has been 
resolved, the issue of corporate personhood remains wide open. 
  

